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Federal narcotics policy and firearms regulation intersect at several 
points. One of these junctures is 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(3), which incorporates 
the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) by reference and thereby prohibits 
violators of the CSA from possessing a firearm. This statutory intersection 
results in more than 14,200 individuals per year failing a background 
check for gun purchases, and more than 600 convictions per year for 
possession of guns by drug users. At the same time, the federal NICS 
background check database contains only 67,000 or so records of drug 
users, due to widespread underreporting by state law enforcement 
agencies, courts, correctional institutions, and drug treatment facilities. 
Circuit courts have consistently upheld the constitutionality of §922(g)(3). 
Incorporation of the CSA into firearm prohibitions poses difficult policy 
tradeoffs. On the one hand, longstanding problems with the CSA, 
including the trending conflict between federal and state marijuana laws, 
spill over into prosecutions for weapons violations and denials of 
prospective firearm purchases. Moreover, other substance abuse 
categories with higher correlations to gun violence, such as alcoholism, 
are entirely missing from the regulatory framework. On the other hand, 
the CSA has ended up playing a vital role in the firearm regulatory regime, 
and in gun violence prevention. This paper will explore the interplay 
between the CSA and gun control from both an ex ante perspective 
(background checks for gun purchases) and an ex post perspective (arrests 
and convictions for users-in-possession of firearms). It also proposes 
legislative and administrative refinements that could resolve some of the 
problems with the existing regime. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Federal narcotics policy and firearms regulation intersect at several points. One 
of these junctures is 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(3),1 which in its current form incorporates 
the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) by reference and thereby prohibits violators 
of the CSA from possessing a firearm. The wording of this provision does not 
mention that a conviction is a requirement—it says that a user who has never faced 
criminal charges is ineligible for firearm purchases or possession. This statutory 
intersection currently results in more than 14,200 individuals per year failing a 
background check for gun purchases,2 and around two hundred convictions per year 
for possession of guns by drug users as the lead charge.3  At the same time, the 
federal National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) database 
contains only 67,000 or so records of drug users,4 due to widespread underreporting 
by state law enforcement agencies, courts, correctional institutions, and drug 
treatment facilities.5  Circuit courts have consistently upheld the constitutionality of 
§922(g)(3),6 even in the years following change in Second Amendment analysis 
 
1    The Gun Control Act of 1968, codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–927 (1976), included 
Titles IV and VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Pub. L. No. 90-351, Title IV, 
Sec. 902, June 19, 1968, 82 Stat. 226, and the Gun Control Act,  Title VII of Pub. L. No. 90-351, June 
19, 1968, 82 Stat. 236. These enactments extended dealer licensing requirements to local gun shops, 
where previous only interstate sales came under the statute’s purview. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(11). In 
addition, the 1968 law expanded the list of individuals prohibited from the sale, shipment, or receipt of 
firearms to include those who used or were addicted to drugs and those adjudicated mental defectives 
or committed to mental institutions. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), (4). See Scott Jacobs, Toward a More 
Reasonable Approach to Gun Control: Canada as a Model, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 315, 
328 (1995). 
2    See FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, FEDERAL DENIALS: REASONS WHY THE NICS SECTION 
DENIES (1998–2020), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/federal_denials.pdf/view (last visited May 
31, 2020) [hereinafter Federal Denials]. The historical average is closer to 7,400 denials per year for 
drug users. To arrive at this number, I divided the total historical number by the number of months for 
the historic period, then used this to calculate an average yearly amount. 
3    See TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (TRAC), FEDERAL WEAPONS 
PROSECUTIONS CONTINUE TO CLIMB IN 2019 (June 5, 2019), https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/560/. 
4    See FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, ACTIVE RECORDS IN THE NICS INDICES (2020), 
https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/active_records_in_the_nics-indices.pdf/view (last updated April 
30, 2020). 
5    BECKI GOGGINS & SHAUNA STRICKLAND, BJS Report: State Progress in Record Reporting 
for Firearm-Related Background Checks: Unlawful Drug Users, (July 2017), https://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/bjs/grants/250782.pdf. 
6    See United States v. Cook, 914 F.3d 545 (7th Cir. 2019); United States v. Yates, 746 Fed. 
Appx. 162 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 616 (2018) (unreported) (per curiam); Wilson v. 
Lynch, 835 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1396 (2017); United States v. Carter, 
750 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 2014), cert denied, 574 U.S. 907 (2014); United States v. May, 538 Fed. Appx. 
465 (5th Cir. 2013) (unreported); United States v. Jacobson, 406 Fed. Appx. 91 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(unreported) (per curiam); United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Yancey, 
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following the Heller7 decision. This symposium contribution will explore the 
interplay between the CSA and gun control from both an ex ante perspective 
(background checks for gun purchases) and an ex post perspective (arrests and 
convictions for users-in-possession of firearms). 
The incorporation of the CSA into firearm prohibitions poses difficult policy 
tradeoffs. On the one hand, longstanding problems with the CSA, including the 
growing conflict between federal and state marijuana laws, spill over into 
prosecutions for weapons violations and denials of prospective firearm purchases. 
Even where marijuana use is legal under state law, marijuana users remain legally 
ineligible for firearm ownership nationwide as marijuana remains illegal under 
federal law.8  The federal firearm disqualification extends to prescription use of 
medical marijuana as well.9  Moreover, other substance abuse categories with higher 
correlations to gun violence, such as alcoholism, are entirely missing from the 
federal regulatory framework.10 
At the same time, there are some features of the current arrangement offsetting 
the downsides, at least in part. Gun control is an area of persistent political failure in 
our society—most Americans want more restrictions on access to firearms,11 albeit 
without a complete ban, but partisan gridlock on this issue stays at a perennial 
impasse. In addition, the 1986 amendments to the Gun Control Act12 that 
incorporated the CSA resolved serious problems with §922’s original ambiguous 
verbiage, and it undoubtedly helped reduce judicial confusion about what “drugs” 
 
621 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); United States v. Richard, 350 Fed. Appx. 252 (10th Cir. 
2009) (unreported). 
7    District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
8    See infra Part III and sources discussed therein. 
9    See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS, AND EXPLOSIVES, OPEN LETTER TO ALL 
FEDERAL FIREARMS LICENSEES (Sept. 2011) https://www.atf.gov/file/60211/download. 
10   See infra Part IV and sources cited therein. 
11   See GALLUP: Guns, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx (last visited Oct. 12, 2020) 
(showing through various poll questions that most Americans want stricter gun laws, though not a 
complete handgun ban); see also POLLING REPORT: Guns, https://www.pollingreport.com/guns.htm 
(last visited May 31, 2020) (similar results); Margaret Talbot, The 2020 Democrats and the New 
Politics of Gun Violence, THE NEW YORKER (Dec. 8, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com 
/magazine/2019/12/16/the-2020-democrats-and-the-new-politics-of-gun-violence; Rachel Treisman, 
Poll: Number of Americans Who Favor Stricter Gun Laws Continues to Grow, NPR (October 20, 
2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/20/771278167/poll-number-of-americans-who-favor-stricter-gun 
-laws-continues-to-grow. 
12   Firearm Owners Protection Act (FOPA), Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 102(6)(B), substituted “is an” 
for “who is an” and “any controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances 
Act (U.S.C. 802));” for “marihuana or any depressant or stimulant drug (as defined in section 201(v) 
of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act) or narcotic drug (as defined in section 4731(a) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954[.]”  See infra Part II.D for the history of amendments that brought § 
922(g)(3) to its present form. 
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made a user ineligible for gun ownership. The current wording of the statute is 
clearer than the original version. 
From a law enforcement perspective, gun control laws, such as those under 18 
U.S.C §922 and §924, probably facilitate investigations by providing alternative 
grounds for officers to meet the evidentiary requirements for obtaining warrants or 
making arrests.13  From a prosecution standpoint, firearms violations normally 
function as additional counts in the charges against drug traffickers, and as 
sentencing enhancements.14  Gun possession charges can serve as failsafe or 
"backup" charges for prosecutors in difficult cases, because of the streamlined 
elements under the statutes and evidence (the mere possession of guns is usually 
proof in itself). Thus, the firearm laws may give prosecutors in drug cases more 
leverage during plea negotiations or with turning a conspirator into a government 
informant; the firearm charges make the prosecutions more likely to be effective or 
successful; and the firearm sentencing enhancements ratchet up the sentences for 
major drug traffickers, which serves both to remove players from the trafficking 
industry and as a deterrent to would-be traffickers. 
Those who fail the background check because they are flagged as a "drug 
user"—that is, they fall under §922(g)(3)—are already in the NICS system as known 
drug users or addicts, often because of repeated arrests on drug charges or a 
misdemeanor drug conviction.15  Those with felony drug convictions fail as felons, 
the largest category of prohibited persons.16  Of course, the NICS system has only a 
tiny fraction of the drug users in their system, as most of the drug courts, drug 
diversion programs, drug counselors, detox centers, methadone clinics, college and 
high school administrators (who suspend students for having drugs), and drug task 
forces do not bother reporting the individuals they are processing.17  With more 
support from state and federal officials, it would be entirely possible to get more of 
 
13   See, e.g., United States v. Leick, 944 F.3d 1017, 1018 (8th Cir. 2019) (police-based warrant 
application on statements from suspect's girlfriend (part of an assault complaint) regarding suspect's 
regular drug use and gun possession). 
14   See Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, Proscription of 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(3) that Persons 
Who Are Unlawful Users of or Addicted to Any Controlled Substance Cannot Possess Any Firearm or 
Ammunition in or Affecting Commerce, 44 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 3, §51 (2019) (Sentencing 
enhancements related to gun possession by drug user—Enhancement imposed). See also Stacey M. 
Studnicki, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1999 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 351, 369 
(1998)(discussing the sentencing enhancement based on gun possession by a drug user in United States 
v. Jarman, 144 F.3d 912 (6th Cir. 1998)). 
15   See infra Part II.C. 
16   See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 
17   See BECKI GOGGINS & SHAUNA STRICKLAND, BJS Report: State Progress in Record 
Reporting for Firearm-Related Background Checks: Unlawful Drug Users, (July 2017), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/250782.pdf. 
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these entities to report, especially if the reporting was computerized and automatic.18  
Later in life, if the person has been "clean" for a while, there is a process to remove 
their names from the NICS do-not-sell list,19 though this process needs some 
improvements as well.20 
When known drug users fail a background check when trying to buy a gun—
the 14,000+ who fail for no other reason than that they're a known drug user, which 
triggers §922(g)(3)—most of the time nothing happens to them; they just leave the 
store and go on their way, even though they just committed a felony by trying to buy 
a gun.21  The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has criticized this 
breakdown in the process.22  Peaceable drug users are one thing, but when a known 
drug user (someone with a history of arrests or misdemeanor convictions) is trying 
to buy a gun, and is desperate enough to walk into a gun store and lie on their 
background check form, violence could follow. 
From a legal realist standpoint, the combination of §922(g)(1) and §922(g)(3) 
in the U.S. Code means that the Controlled Substances Act is actually the main 
device in our legal system that limits the number of firearms sold, the main device 
that in practice limits criminals' access to guns, and so on. Given that most felony 
convictions are drug-related, our otherwise-goofy federal drug law ends up being 
our primary operational form of gun control—nothing else even comes close, except 
the age requirements for purchasers. Despite the awful problems with the Controlled 
Substances Act and the mass incarceration it produces, one could argue that the CSA 
is our main form of gun control right now. It is the main reason the background 
check system matters at all. 
We could reduce all the maximum sentences under the Controlled Substances 
Act to one year and a day, and sentence all convicted violators to time served (during 
arrest lockup and pretrial detention) and supervised release, and all the gun-control 
benefits of the CSA would remain in place. Those convicted of drug possession 
 
18   See id.; see also WILLIAM P. BARR, The Attorney General’s Semiannual Report on the Fix 
NICS Act (November 2019), https://www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1217396/download. 
19   See 28 C.F.R. § 25.10 (Correction of erroneous system information); FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION: APPEALS AND VOLUNTARY APPEAL FILE (VAF), https://www.fbi.gov/services/ 
cjis/nics/national-instant-criminal-background-check-system-nics-appeals-vaf (last visited May 31, 
2020) [hereinafter VAF Brochure]. 
20   See Snyder v. United States, No. 18-5504 RJB, 2019 WL 5592948, (W.D. Wash. Oct. 30, 
2019); DRU STEVENSON, New NICS Case: Snyder v. United States, Part I, SECOND THOUGHTS, 
November 26, 2019, https://sites.law.duke.edu/secondthoughts/2019/11/26/new-nics-case-snyder-v-
united-states-part-i; DRU STEVENSON, New NICS Case: Snyder v. United States, Part II, SECOND 
THOUGHTS, November 27, 2019, https://sites.law.duke.edu/secondthoughts/2019/11/27/new-nics-case-
snyder-v-united-states-part-ii.  
21   See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT: FEW INDIVIDUALS DENIED 
FIREARMS PURCHASES ARE PROSECUTED AND ATF SHOULD ASSESS USE OF WARNING NOTICES IN LIEU 
OF PROSECUTIONS, GAO-18-440 (Sept. 2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/694290.pdf. 
22   See id. 
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would become unable to buy or own guns (a good thing) but would not have to spend 
half their lives in jail (also a good thing).23 
Conversely, drugs are a primary reason we need gun control. Drug laws impose 
serious downsides, but highly addictive narcotics always present social problems, 
whether they are legal or illegal. Dependent users become desperate for the product, 
whether they are chemically dependent/addicted or psychologically 
dependent/addicted to recreational substance abuse. The product itself, per kilogram, 
is extremely valuable. The price per kilogram means that some people have enough 
incentive to steal it that they may resort to violence; traffickers of the commodity 
carry around so much cash (after a sale) or precious cargo that many will resort to 
lethal force (immediately) to defend it; and market rivals have so much at stake, and 
to gain, that they may resort to lethal force to protect or expand their customer base. 
Could we call this the Breaking Bad phenomenon?  There is just too much at stake 
for all the parties involved in this market. Even if drugs were legal, this may not 
change—narcotics are a unique product, creating an inevitably unique market that 
will always be susceptible to violence. Even if we legalize narcotics, I believe they 
will continue to be the main source of concentrated gun violence in society. 
The discussion proceeds as follows: Part II explains the ex ante and ex post 
consequences of the “drug user” prohibition clause in §922(g)(3), as well as the 
codified ATF regulations defining “drug user” for purposes of enforcement and a 
brief history of the legislative amendments that led to the current wording of the 
statute. In addition, Part II overviews the current consensus in the courts upholding 
the statute against constitutional challenges, including failed Second Amendment 
challenges. Part III delves into what is currently the most problematic issue with 
§922(g)(3)—its continuing applicability to medical marijuana users (and others) in 
states where such use is lawful. A confusing series of guidance documents from 
successive Attorneys General, and a high-profile outlier case from Oregon, have 
generated significant uncertainty in this area, though enforcement seems to continue 
targeting offenders who are in fact violent. Part IV opens a discussion of what is 
missing in this statutory and penal framework—the connection of chronic alcohol 
abuse with gun violence and gun suicide. A brief conclusion recaps the main themes 
of this Article and stakes out some strong policy positions. 
 
II. INCORPORATION: UNLAWFUL USER OF OR ADDICTED TO ANY CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE 
 
Section 922 of the Gun Control Act of 1968 prohibits certain persons from 
possessing or seeking to possess a firearm. Due to a series of amendments, one of 
the prohibitions currently refers to “section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act” 
 
23   For an excellent discussion of the excessively long prison sentences related to firearms 
offenses, see Benjamin Levin, Guns and Drugs, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2173 (2016). This author favors 
gun restrictions and permanent disarmament (subject to inspections or verification) as a sanction, but 
not the lengthy periods of incarceration that now apply to firearm violations. 
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to define a person who is an “unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled 
substance.”24  Users of substances covered under the CSA, therefore, cannot 
purchase, own, use, or sell a firearm or ammunition. The prohibition has both ex 
ante and ex post applications. 
 
A. Ex Ante: Drug Users and NICS Background Checks 
 
From an ex ante perspective, firearm purchases from federally licensed dealers 
(FFLs) require background checks for most purchases,25 and illegal drug use is one 
of the screening criteria for these background checks. The background check 
questionnaire (ATF Form 4473) asks the purchaser to check a box Yes/No whether 
they are a user of or addicted to an illegal drug; if the purchaser checks “Yes,” the 
FBI’s electronic background check system (NICS) will automatically deny the 
purchase. If the purchaser checks “No,” the NICS system will check the purchaser’s 
name against three federal databases for records of any of the nine prohibiting factors 
(felony convictions being by far the most common). If the individual is in one of the 
databases as a “drug user,” which is relatively unlikely, the system will deny the 
purchase. Note that in most states, private gun sales (not involving a licensed dealer) 
do not require background checks, meaning an individual who fails a background 
check with the licensed dealer might then seek out a private seller instead to obtain 
a gun on the secondary market, though this may involve additional inconvenience 
or expense (i.e., transaction costs) for the would-be purchaser.26  Of course, it is also 
illegal for such a person to buy a gun from an unlicensed private seller, but without 
universal background checks, there is no way to prevent or screen such purchases. 
According to ATF, around 14, 208 individuals failed background checks in 2019 for 
 
24   See 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3), (g)(3), (s)(3)(B)(iii) (2018), In particular, 18 U.S.C. §922 (g)(3) 
provides “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person . . . who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any 
controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 
802) to . . . possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm . . . . ” 
25   About fifteen states have background checks for concealed-carry permits extensive enough 
that ATF considers them duplicative of the purchaser background checks, so in these states, such permit 
holders are exempt from undergoing a background check when purchasing a firearm from an FFL. 
These states screen for records of illegal drug use as part of the criteria for the permit background 
check. In addition, the FBI, which operates the background check system, has a special procedure for 
obtaining a type of pre-clearance for future background checks that streamlines subsequent purchases 
and checks; this option is mostly for individuals who routinely fail background checks because they 
share the same name with a felon in their state—they can obtain an identification number from the FBI 
to avoid future confusion with other individuals who share a name or other identifying information. 
26   Note that twenty-one states and Washington DC have extended background check 
requirements to some or all private gun sales, which goes beyond what federal law requires, though 
only twelve states require background checks on all gun sales and transfers. See GIFFORDS L. CTR., 
UNIVERSAL BACKGROUND CHECKS, https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/background-
checks/universal-background-checks/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2020). 
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this criterion, that is, being “drug users/addicts.”27  This is a tiny number compared 
to several million purchasers who pass their background checks every year; but the 
raw number of denials for “drug user/addict” has been steadily increasing for many 
years: 
 
• 14,208 in 2019 (13.7% of all 2019 denials)28 
• 13,597 in 2018 (13.6% of all 2018 denials)29 
• 12,710 in 2017 (12% of all 2017 denials)30 
• 11,278 in 2016 (9.3% of all 2016 denials)31 
• 10,261 in 2915 (6.3% of all 2015 denials)32 
• 9,449 in 2014 (10.3% of all 2014 denials)33 
• 9,178 in 2013 (8.3% total denials of all years aggregate to date)34 
 
27   Compare all-time totals on Dec 31, 2018 (147,460) and Dec 31, 2019 (161,668). SEE DEP’T 
JUST. & FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, NATIONAL INSTANT CRIMINAL BACKGROUND 
CHECK SYSTEM (NICS) SECTION 2018 OPERATIONS REPORT (2018), https://www.fbi.gov/file-
repository/2018-nics-operations-report.pdf/view [hereinafter 2018 OPERATIONS REPORT]; see also 
FEDERAL DENIALS, supra note 2. 
28   See FEDERAL DENIALS, supra note 2. 
29   See 2018 OPERATIONS REPORT, supra note 27, at 18. 
30   See DEP’T JUST. & FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, NATIONAL INSTANT CRIMINAL 
BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM (NICS) OPERATIONS 2017, at 16, https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ 
2017-nics-operations-report.pdf/view (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) [hereinafter 2017 OPERATIONS 
REPORT].  
31   See DEP’T JUST. & FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, NATIONAL INSTANT CRIMINAL 
BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM (NICS) OPERATIONS 2016, at 19, https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ 
2016-nics-operations-report-final-5-3-2017.pdf/view (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) [hereinafter 2016 
OPERATIONS REPORT].  
32   See DEP’T JUST. & FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, NATIONAL INSTANT CRIMINAL 
BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM (NICS) OPERATIONS 2015, at 12, https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ 
2015-nics-ops-report.pdf/view (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) [hereinafter 2015 OPERATIONS REPORT].  
33   See DEP’T JUST. & FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, NATIONAL INSTANT CRIMINAL 
BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM (NICS) OPERATIONS 2014, at 18, https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ 
2014-nics-ops-report-050115.pdf/view (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) [hereinafter 2014 OPERATIONS 
REPORT].  
34   See FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, NATIONAL INSTANT CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM 
(NICS) OPERATIONS 2013, https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/about-us/cjis/nics/reports/2013-operations-
report (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) [hereinafter 2013 OPERATIONS REPORT]. 
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• 8,798 in 201235 (more difficult to estimate percentages for earlier years) 
• 7,563 in 201136 
 
Observe that even though the raw number of drug user NICS denials has 
increased every year,  denials for drug users as a percentage of all NICS denials 
increased steadily during the Obama years, but seems to have leveled off under the 
Trump Administration at a little over 13.5%. The number of total background checks 
per year significantly increased during these years, so the raw numbers of denials 
have climbed commensurately. The increase in background checks is due partly to 
increased gun sales during the Obama years, and also the increase in concealed-carry 
permitting during this period (now available in every state), which increasingly 
involves NICS background checks for initial permitting and periodic renewals. For 
purposes of the present discussion, the Controlled Substances Act now results in 
more than 14,000 individuals per year failing firearm background checks for 
purchases or concealed-carry permits.37 
The steady increase in CSA-related denials is not, however, a result of an 
increasing number of users in the NICS system. Interestingly, the number of active 
records of “unlawful drug users/addicts” in the NICS databases has fluctuated 
counterintuitively over the same period, although in 2019 it surged to an all-time 
high: 
 
• 2019 - 67,032 active records in NICS for "unlawful drug users/addicts"38 
• 2018 - 45,152 active records of drug users39 
• 2017 - 29,909 active records of drug users40 
• 2016 - 22,831 active records of drug users41 
• 2015 - 23,211 active records of drug users42 
 
35   See FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, NATIONAL INSTANT CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECK 
SYSTEM (NICS) OPERATIONS 2012 (2012), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/about-us/cjis/nics/reports 
/2012-operations-report (last visited Oct. 10[hereinafter 2012 OPERATIONS REPORT]. 
36   See DEP’T JUST. & FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, NATIONAL INSTANT CRIMINAL 
BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM (NICS) OPERATIONS 2011 (2011), https://www.fbi.gov/file-
repository/2011-nics-ops-report.pdf/view (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) [hereinafter 2011 OPERATIONS 
REPORT]. 
37   Some of the denials could be multiple denials for the same individuals—an individual might 
repeatedly fail background checks in a given year—but it seems unlikely that many individuals would 
continue trying to pass background checks with licensed dealers after failing the first time. 
38   See FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, supra note 4. 
39   See 2018 OPERATIONS REPORT, supra note 27, at 26. 
40   See 2017 OPERATIONS REPORT, supra note 30, at 27. 
41   See 2016 OPERATIONS REPORT, supra note 31, at 26. 
42   See 2015 OPERATIONS REPORT, supra note 32, at 17. 
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• 2014 - 24,281 active records of drug users43 
• 2013 - 33,909 active records of drug users44 
• 2012 - 18,174 active records of drug users45 
• 2011 - 14,930 active records of drug users46 
• 2010 - 2,092 active records of drug users47 
 
Observe that the number of drug users in the NICS databases decreased in 2015 
and 2016, due to an effort at the end of the Obama Administration to clean up or 
clear out old or obsolete records of drug arrests that could no longer serve as indicia 
of current drug users under ATF regulations. The number of denials increased in 
these same years, despite the purging of active records—there were fewer listed drug 
users in the database to trigger a failed background check, but the number of 
background checks was increasing so rapidly in this period that it outpaced the 
reduction in active records. The remarkable increases in 2018 and 2019 correspond 
to the efforts under Attorney General William Barr and his predecessor to improve 
reporting between federal law enforcement agencies and from state law enforcement 
agencies to NICS.48  Note, however, that the NICS denials for drug users, though 
continuing to rise, did not rise in proportion to the number of active records that 
would trigger such denials. In addition, even though the increase is due mostly to 
the huge increase in the number of background checks, it is noteworthy that the 
number of drug-related denials steadily increased even as more states legalized 
marijuana use to varying degrees. 
 
43   See 2014 OPERATIONS REPORT, supra note 33, at 26. 
44   See 2013 OPERATIONS REPORT, supra note 34. 
45   See 2012 OPERATIONS REPORT, supra note 35. 
46   See 2011 OPERATIONS REPORT, supra note 36. 
47   See DEP’T JUST. & FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, NATIONAL INSTANT CRIMINAL 
BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM (NICS) OPERATIONS 2010, https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/2010-
nics-ops-report-4-19-11-1.pdf/view (last visited Oct 10, 2020). 
48   See GOGGINS & STRICKLAND, supra note 17. 
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B. Ex Post Enforcement 
 
The prohibition has an ex post application as well. Even if an illegal drug user 
passes their background check, which they usually will do, or sidesteps the 
background check through a private unlicensed seller, it is still a felony for the drug 
user to possess a firearm. If the individual lied on their background check form and 
passed their background check despite being a drug user, because their name was 
not in the NICS system, they may face charges under both §922(g)(3) and the statute 
that forbids false statements on the background check form.49  If the individual 
acquired the gun without a background check (i.e., private sellers, gift, loan, theft, 
or inheritance), they will face charges only under §922(g)(3), although many of these 
cases involve additional crimes that led the police to discover the gun, such as an 
assault, robbery, or a drug arrest. Charges under §922(g)(3) may compound with 
other charges, such as drug possession, felon-in-possession, violations of probation, 
and so forth. 
According to federal statistics, there are now around 200 prosecutions per year 
with this crime as the lead charge,50 a small number compared to the felon-in-
possession convictions, but still the third-highest subsection of §922(g) in terms of 
lead charge in federal prosecutions.51  Moreover, if a lawful gun owner at some point 
becomes an illegal drug user, at that point their gun ownership becomes a crime. 
Conversely, a drug user who stops using drugs can then lawfully own firearms—the 
drug use and gun ownership must be contemporaneous to violate the statute. 
Pretrial issues can arise in cases brought under §922(g)(3), such as its 
applicability to lawful users of marijuana under state law.52  Defendants charged 
under the statute may seek a bill of particulars specifying the evidence that the 
accused is indeed a “drug user,” or challenges to the evidence (either its reliability 
or admissibility), or the sufficiency of the evidence for indictment.53  Raising a 
defense that the “drug use” was a one-time occurrence has been effective in 
 
49   18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6) and 924(a)(2). 
50   See TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (TRAC), FEDERAL WEAPONS 
PROSECUTIONS CONTINUE TO CLIMB IN 2019 (June 5, 2019), https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/560/. 
51   See TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, FEDERAL WEAPONS PROSECUTIONS 
RISE FOR THIRD CONSECUTIVE YEAR, https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/492/ (Nov. 29, 2017) (see 
Table 2, Number of Federal Criminal Prosecutions by Lead Charge, FY 2008-2017). Note that based 
on comparisons of historical data and 2019 TRAC Reports, supra note 50 the number of prosecutions 
with § 922(g)(3) as the lead charge nearly doubled in 2019 compared to previous years. 
52   See Winbush, supra note 14, at 4. 
53   See id. 
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defeating the charge,54 but claiming selective enforcement of the law has not.55  
Second Amendment challenges to the statute have generally proved unsuccessful,56 
a point discussed in detail below. Defenses of self-defense (necessity of carrying a 
firearm due to threats),57 entrapment by estoppel,58 and duress59 have also proved 
unsuccessful in defeating charges under §922(g)(3). Even law enforcement officers 
can face convictions under the statute, if they are unlawful drug users, despite the 
fact that their firearm possession was required by their employment in the police 
force.60 
 
C. Defining “Unlawful User or Addicted to Any Controlled Substance” 
 
The 1997 Treasury Decision from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms (ATF), provided the following regulatory definition for purposes of 
enforcement: 
 
A person who uses a controlled substance and has lost the power of self-
control with reference to the use of the controlled substance; and any 
person who is a current user of a controlled substance in a manner other 
than as prescribed by a licensed physician. Such use is not limited to the 
use of drugs on a particular day, or within a matter of days or weeks before, 
but rather that the unlawful use has occurred recently enough to indicate 
that the individual is actively engaged in such conduct. A person may be 
an unlawful current user of a controlled substance even though the 
substance is not being used at the precise time the person seeks to acquire 
a firearm or receives or possesses a firearm. An inference of current use 
may be drawn from evidence of a recent use or possession of a controlled 
substance or a pattern of use or possession that reasonably covers the 
present time, e.g., a conviction for use or possession of a controlled 
 
54   See, e.g., United States v. Robles, 129 Fed. Appx. 736 (3d Cir. 2005) (single occasion drug 
use insufficient for conviction under statute); United States v. Augustin, 376 F.3d 135 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(same). 
55   See United States v. May, 538 Fed. Appx. 465 (5th Cir. 2013) (selective prosecution defense 
rejected by court); see also Winbush, supra note 14, at 5. 
56   See Winbush, supra note 55. 
57   See United States v. Eads, 327 Fed. Appx. 671 (8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
58   See United States v. Fischer, 253 Fed. Appx. 668 (9th Cir. 2007). 
59   See United States v. Barnes, 469 Fed. Appx. 733 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). 
60   See Gordon v. United States, 2008 WL 4933989 (M.D. Ala. 2008) (unreported). 
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substance within the past year, or multiple arrests for such offenses within 
the past five years if the most recent arrest occurred within the past year.61 
 
ATF subsequently promulgated and codified an expanded version of this 
definition, so that federal regulations now also include “persons found through a 
drug test to use a controlled substance unlawfully, provided that the test was 
administered within the past year.”62  Thus, the prohibited class includes individuals 
who have been arrested but not convicted for unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance within the past five years, individuals who have failed a drug test in the 
past year, and individuals who use controlled substances (including prescription 
drugs) in a manner other than as prescribed. Importantly, the incorporation of the 
CSA does not require a prior criminal conviction related to controlled substances, 
but merely an ongoing violation of the CSA. Both the GCA and CSA include 
“immediate precursors” of controlled substances under their regulatory definitions.63  
Regular users of any of these controlled substances violate §922(g)(3) by possessing 
or seeking to possess a firearm. Note that the federal firearm disqualification applies 
even to medical marijuana users with a prescription in states that have legalized such 
use,64 a subject discussed in more detail below. 
Very recently, in United States v. Tanco-Baez,65 the First Circuit adopted a 
more stringent standard on the prosecution to prove the judicially-created elements 
of “unlawful user.”66  The Court held that an admission by a defendant to collateral 
facts that are not to an element of the crime, but rather necessary to proving them, 
such as a defendant’s “statement in his interview with the law enforcement agent 
about the length and nature of his drug use[,] must be corroborated if it is to be relied 
 
61   T.D. ATF-391 Definitions for the Categories of Persons Prohibited from Receiving Firearms 
(Jun. 27, 1997), https://www.atf.gov/file/84311/download; see also 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2019). 
62   27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2019). 
63   Id. (“A drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, as defined in section 102 of the 
Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 802.  The term includes, but is not limited to, marijuana, 
depressants, stimulants, and narcotic drugs.  The term does not include distilled spirits, wine, malt 
beverages, or tobacco, as those terms are defined or used in Subtitle E of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986, as amended.”). See also Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.A. § 802(23) (West 2019) (“The 
term ‘immediate precursor’ means a substance (A) which the Attorney General has found to be and by 
regulation designated as being the principal compound used, or produced primarily for use, in the 
manufacture of a controlled substance; (B) which is an immediate chemical intermediary used or likely 
to be used in the manufacture of such controlled substance; and (C) the control of which is necessary 
to prevent, curtail, or limit the manufacture of such controlled substance.”). 
64   Attorney General’s Open Letter to All Federal Firearms Licensees, supra note 9. 
65   942 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2019). 
66   See id. at 15 (“To establish the ‘unlawful user’ element of this offense, the government must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant used controlled substances regularly, (2) that 
the use took place over a long period of time, and (3) that the use was proximate to or contemporaneous 
with his possession of a firearm.”). 
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upon to support his conviction.”67  An officer testified that the defendant in this 
particular case “admitted . . . . in a post-arrest interview that he had gone into a 
vehicle to smoke marijuana that day, that he ‘smoked on a daily basis and that it had 
been a long time since he had started,’ and that he possessed the machinegun on the 
day of the events.”68  Since the government did “not argue that there [was] any 
independent evidence in the record that in and of itself tends to establish that [the 
defendant] was a long-term drug user”69 and failed to point to “the drugs found in 
[the defendant’s] shoe on the day of his arrest—as corroborative of his admission of 
his recent drug use,”70 the court rejected the government’s claims that fortification 
of the defendant’s other admissions (for example, his recent drug use and other 
admissions) sufficiently corroborated “the nature and duration of his past drug 
use.”71  Holding that the government failed to establish that the defendant regularly 
used drugs over a long period of time, the court hedged that such a determination 
depends on the facts and circumstances of the individual case.72  Notwithstanding 
the disclaimer, the court’s requirement of independent corroborating evidence seems 
to place an additional burden on the prosecution’s case-in-chief under 18 U.S.C. 
§922(g)(3). 
The true reach or impact of the “drug user” prohibition in the GCA is hard to 
quantify. The prohibition punishes direct violations, but may also serve as a proxy 
for other violations, or leverage as a potential additional charge during plea 
negotiations, or a means of increasing the sentence for other violations.73  For 
 
67   Id. at 16. 
68   Id. at 14. 
69   Id. at 16. 
70   Id. The court noted that the law is unclear as to whether the government could even have 
argued this: “We note that the caselaw is not consistent in its treatment of whether such evidence can 
corroborate such an admission.” Id. at 22. 
71   Id. at 23. 
72   Id. at 25. 
73  It is important to distinguish the additional charge as a form of ad hoc sentence enhancement 
as well as the effect of the conviction on discretionary sentence enhancement based on the violation of 
§922(g) from gun-related factors in the federal sentencing guidelines. The latter are subject to the 
qualifications imposed in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005) (“Any fact (other than a 
prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the 
facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”). The legal distinction, however, does not appear to affect federal 
prosecutors’ ability to convict on charges of violating §922(g)(3), because so many defendants admit 
to a history of drug use, even if they deny the instant drug charges. For example, on remand from the 
United States Supreme Court on the issue of the mandatory sentencing guidelines under Booker, the 
Eighth Circuit reaffirmed the sentence enhancement of a defendant convicted of conspiring to 
manufacture methamphetamine and “for being an unlawful user of controlled substances in possession 
of a firearm.”  United States v. Turnbull, 414 F.3d 942, 943 (8th Cir. 2005). The Eight Circuit found in 
its first review ample support for the §922(g)(3) violation, including that the defendant had admitted to 
using meth for a year prior to the arrest, including “a ‘couple’ times” the week before his arrest. Id. at 
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example, defendants may plead guilty to violating §922(g)(3) after being arrested 
for both possession of marijuana and a firearm and confessing to regular use of the 
controlled substance.74  Likewise, federal prosecutors can add §922(g)(3) charges to 
other firearms charges, resulting in longer sentences.75  As a result, violations 
manifest not only as proxy charges, but also as additional charges that increase 
sentences for drug violations, particularly in drug trafficking and distribution 
offenses (which fall under a separate paragraph of §922(g)).76  Guidance from the 
Department of Justice provides that prosecutors should include all relevant 
violations of § 922(g) as separate charges, in part because defendants commonly 
challenge their inclusion in these categories of excluded persons, thus charging the 
offense under multiple classes enhances the likelihood of preserving the 
conviction.77  Convictions under the statute primarily affect felons in possession of 
 
560. “He further admitted the methamphetamine found in a secret compartment in his vehicle was 
his . . . his driver's license was found in a coffee cup containing meth residue (suggesting very recent 
use), and his home contained numerous drug paraphernalia and photographs depicting him and others 
in drug-related activities.”  Id. at 560–62. 
74   See United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (reviewing 
constitutional challenge where defendant pleaded guilty to violating § 922(g)(3) after being arrested 
for both possession of marijuana and carrying a loaded firearm, and confessed to smoking the 
controlled substance daily); Press Release, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUFFALO MAN PLEADS GUILTY TO 
USING A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WHILE POSSESSING A FIREARM (Jun. 25, 2019), 
https://www.atf.gov/news/pr/buffalo-man-pleads-guilty-using-controlled-substance-while-
possessing-firearm (announcing defendant pleaded guilty to being a user of a controlled substance in 
possession of firearm after  being arrested for possession of marijuana, possessing a firearm and 
admitting “he was and is an unlawful user of marijuana”). 
75   Press Release, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHRISTOPHER HASSON PLEADS GUILTY TO FEDERAL 
CHARGES OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF SILENCERS, POSSESSION OF FIREARMS BY AN ADDICT TO AND 
UNLAWFUL USER OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, AND POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (Oct. 
3, 2019), https://www.atf.gov/news/pr/christopher-hasson-pleads-guilty-federal-charges-illegal-
possession-silencers-possession (announcing guilty plea to two counts pertaining to unlawful 
possession of silencers, possession of a controlled substance, and violating § 922(g)(3) after defendant 
was arrested for ordering and personally taking Tramadol pills daily without a lawful prescription and 
knowing both that it was illegal and that he was addicted because “[d]uring the time of his use of 
Tramadol, Hasson also conducted Internet searches and visited websites that discussed addiction and 
Tramadol withdrawal”). 
76   Press Release, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATT’Y OFFICE FOR S.D. OF TEX., SYNTHETIC 
NARCOTICS AND FIREARMS CHARGES RESULT IN SIGNIFICANT PRISON SENTENCES (Jan. 11, 2018), 
https://www.atf.gov/news/pr/synthetic-narcotics-and-firearms-charges-result-significant-prison-
sentences (announcing convictions of five defendants for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, 
three of which were likewise convicted of possession of firearm in violation of § 922(g): two were in 
“possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime,” one “was also convicted of 
possession of a machine gun conversion device,” and one “admitted to possession of a firearm in 
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime and felon in possession of a firearm.”). 
77   Memorandum from Asst. Att’y Gen. Robert S. Meuller, III, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, on 
Prosecutions Under 18 U.S.C. §922(g) (Nov. 3, 1992) as reprinted in Justice Manual: Criminal 
Resource Manual (CRM), at 1431, https://www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-resource-manual-1431-
department-memorandum-prosecutions-under-922g (“It is appropriate to charge a defendant who has 
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a firearm,78 and felons continue to comprise “[t]he top prohibiting category for 
individuals denied firearms purchases.”79  Court opinions and government 
publications link habitual drug users with the same level of potential for violent 
crime as violent felons.80 
As mentioned above, § 922(g)(3) itself does not require drug-related 
convictions in order to violate the prohibition against firearm possession by a person 
who is “an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance,” and this open-
endedness has forced courts to address the scope and constitutionality of the 
provision. For example, the Seventh Circuit has observed that “unlike those who 
have been convicted of a felony or committed to a mental institution and so face a 
lifetime ban, an unlawful drug user . . . could regain his right to possess a firearm 
simply by ending his drug abuse.”81  Of course, many “users” of controlled 
substances have their usage history highlighted during proceedings for felony drug 
possession charges.82 
 
multiple disqualifying factors with a separate count of unlawful weapons possession under §922(g) for 
each disqualifying status.”). See also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL, 9-63.514 - Prosecutions 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-63000-protection-public-order#9-
63.514#9-63.514. 
78   Id. “In most prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the defendant is a previously convicted 
felon who is in possession of a firearm. However, a number of cases involve weapons possession by a 
defendant who simultaneously maintains more than one disqualifying status under § 922 (g).” Id. 
79   U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-18-440, LAW ENFORCEMENT: FEW INDIVIDUALS 
DENIED FIREARMS PURCHASES ARE PROSECUTED AND ATF SHOULD ASSESS USE OF WARNING NOTICES 
IN LIEU OF PROSECUTIONS, 73 (Sept. 2018). 
80   See, e.g., Yancey, 621 F.3d at 684 (“Keeping guns away from habitual drug abusers is 
analogous to disarming felons.”). This is not to suggest any categorical sentencing impacts like those 
at issue in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). This general perception warrants mention 
in reference to nonviolent medical marijuana use. In addition, given that many cases herein reflect 
convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) corresponding with convictions for other unlawful conduct, 
the drug user status addresses possession before prosecutors obtain felony convictions (after 
conviction, § 922(g)(1) prohibits possession by convicted felons). In these cases, habitual drug users 
faced charges for violating § 922(g)(3) and conduct such as distributing illegal substances, an activity 
which the justice system perceives as inherently violent. See Press Release, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. 
ATT’Y OFFICE FOR S.D., SIOUX FALLS MAN SENTENCED FOR CONSPIRACY TO DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.atf.gov/news/pr/sioux-falls-man-sentenced-conspiracy-
distribute-controlled-substance (“Drug trafficking is an inherently violent activity. Firearms are tools 
of the trade for drug dealers. It is common to find drug traffickers armed with guns in order to protect 
their illegal drug product and cash and enforce their illegal operations.”). 
81   Yancey, 621 F.3d at 686. 
82   See, e.g., United States v. Oleson, 310 F.3d 1085, 1090 (8th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he government 
presented an overwhelming amount of testimony that Oleson was in the business of selling 
methamphetamine.”); United States v. Turnbull, 349 F.3d at 560; United States. v. McIntosh, 23 F.3d 
1454, 1456–59 (8th Cir. 1994) (recounting the defendant’s most recent arrest record including that 
police arrested defendant for adult abuse, then fifteen days later, police executed a search warrant on 
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Across jurisdictions, courts consistently interpret the violation under 
§922(g)(3) as a separate and insular offense from being a felon-in-possession; and 
courts treat §922(g)(3) as limited durationally in its effect on a convicted person’s 
ability to possess a gun.83  A drug user or addict regains eligibility for gun ownership 
by not being arrested for possession of controlled substances in a period of one to 
five years, or for other drug-related offenses, and by not possessing drugs or using 
drugs in fact for a similar period.84  In defining the scope of the statute, courts 
consistently scrutinize the regularity of drug use and the nexus between the drug use 
and firearm possession.85  Prosecutors therefore must establish both the defendant’s 
current status as a drug user by showing regularity of use as well as his 
contemporaneous gun possession. This regularity requirement eliminates the one-
time user, but beyond that, the courts provide no absolute threshold to meet “user” 
 
his apartment and seized guns, drugs, and paraphernalia, after which defendant “admitted he sold 
marijuana from his residence [and] he carried a gun when selling the drugs.”). 
83   See United States. v. Emond, No. 2:12-CR-00044-NT, 2012 WL 4964506, at *5 (D. Me. Oct. 
17, 2012) (“[A]s other circuits have noted, unlike §922(g)'s prohibition of firearm possession by felons 
and those who have been committed because of mental illness, §922(g)(3)'s prohibition on firearm 
possession by unlawful drug users is a temporary restriction that lasts only as long as the person 
continues using drugs.”). 
84   Cf. T.D. ATF-391, supra note 61 (“An inference of current use may be drawn from evidence 
of a recent use or possession of a controlled substance or a pattern of use or possession that reasonably 
covers the present time, e.g., a conviction for use or possession of a controlled substance within the 
past year, or multiple arrests for such offenses within the past five years if the most recent arrest 
occurred within the past year.”). 
85   See United States v. Burchard, 580 F.3d 341, 347 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that “[t]he Third, 
Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have stated that there must be some regularity of drug use in addition to 
contemporaneousness to meet the statute's requirements.”); United States v. Kimbrough, 319 F. Supp. 
3d 912, 916 (M.D. Tenn. 2018) (quoting Yancey, 621 F.3d at 687 (“Even if there is some disagreement 
as to the exact nature and scope of the temporal proximity between drug use and possession of a firearm, 
‘[e]very circuit to have considered the question has demanded that the habitual abuse be 
contemporaneous with the gun possession.’”). Cf. United States v. Herrera, 313 F.3d 882, 885 (5th Cir. 
2002) (“for a defendant to be ‘unlawful user’ for §922(g)(3) purposes, his ‘drug use would have to be 
with regularity and over an extended period of time’. The Government reiterated this at en banc oral 
argument: ‘We certainly wouldn't charge one-time use. It would have to be over a period of time.’  
Pursuant to our record-review, the record is not devoid of evidence that . . . [defendant] unlawfully 
used cocaine while possessing firearms.”); Turnbull, 349 F.3d at 561–62 (“Although [defendant] 
contends the evidence was insufficient to show a temporal nexus between his drug use and his 
possession of guns, by his own admission he had been using methamphetamine for an extended period 
of time (one year), and had become high a couple times within the week of when firearms were found 
in his home . . . . From this evidence the jury could clearly infer a sufficient temporal nexus between 
regular drug use and [defendant’s] possession of firearms.”). 
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status.86  The contemporaneous possession of the firearm merely requires reasonable 
overlap with a period of regular drug use.87 
A very recent case from Texas illustrates some benevolent collateral effects of 
the law. In November 2019, Texas law enforcement officers arrested Aiden Bruce-
Umbaugh and an accomplice while they were driving a car.88  A search of the vehicle 
produced “an AR-15 rifle, two AK-47 rifles, a Sig Sauer 9mm pistol, at least 1,500 
rounds of ammunition, a small canister of marijuana, and approximately two grams 
of THC oil.”89  Deputies pulled the vehicle over in a routine traffic stop and found it 
occupied by the driver and Bruce-Umbaugh.90  In a state where marijuana is illegal, 
a drug sniffing canine alerted law enforcement to the criminal activity justifying the 
search of the vehicle.91  Bruce-Umbaugh admitted to owning the weapons found in 
the vehicle, possessing the marijuana, and smoking marijuana on a daily basis; he 
 
86   See United States v. Burchard, 580 F.3d 341, 346 (6th Cir. 2009) (“A one-time use of a 
controlled substance is not sufficient to be an unlawful user . . . [r]ather, the Defendant must have been 
engaged in the regular use.”); United States v. Augustin, 376 F.3d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 2004) (“There was 
no evidence that Augustin had ever used drugs prior to the single use on June 28, or that he ever used 
drugs again. All the evidence disclosed was that Augustin used drugs on June 28 and possessed a 
firearm on June 29, roughly six hours later. That evidence was insufficient to support his conviction 
under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(3).”). 
87   See Burchard, 580 F.3d at 346 (holding that defendant need not use “the controlled substance 
at the precise time he possessed the firearm” but rather it is sufficient where there is “a pattern of use 
or pattern of possession of a controlled substance that reasonably covers the time a firearm was 
possessed”); United States v. Corona, 849 F.2d 562, 567 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1084 
(1989) (holding that the government need not prove the defendant used drugs “at the exact moment he 
purchased the firearms in question in order to be convicted as an ‘unlawful user’”). 
88   Note there is a discrepancy as to the spelling of his first name. Christine Clarridge, Suspected 
neo-Nazi with ties to Washington state faces federal gun charge after arrest in Texas, SEATTLE TIMES 
(Nov. 15, 2019 at 9:19 am Updated Nov. 15, 2019 at 10:16 am) (“While Washington state court records 
spell Bruce-Umbaugh’s first name ‘Aidan,’ Department of Justice records spell his first name ‘Aiden.’ 
The Seattle Times could not immediately resolve the discrepancy.”) https://www.seattletimes.com/ 
seattle-news/crime/neo-nazi-with-ties-to-washington-state-faces-federal-gun-charge-after-arrest-in-
texas/. 
89   Press Release, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATT’Y OFFICE FOR N.D. OF TEX., SUSPECTED NEO-
NAZI CHARGED WITH GUN CRIME (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndtx/pr/suspected-
neo-nazi-charged-gun-crime. 
90   The driver and passenger apparently appeared suspicious given their behavior which 
included possessing an exposed machete in the driver compartment of the vehicle, sporting 
“combat/tactical attire,” and avoiding eye contact with deputies. Asher Stockler, Alleged Neo-Nazi 
Charged with Illegal Possession of Semi-Automatic Rifles, Thousands of Rounds of Ammunition, 
NEWSWEEK (Nov. 15, 2019), available at https://www.newsweek.com/aiden-bruce-umbaugh-neo-
nazi-firearms-1472083. 
91   Id. 
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was therefore charged with violating § 922(g)(3) as an unlawful user of a controlled 
substance in possession of a firearm.92 
The back story of the arrestees is disturbing. The driver of the vehicle at the 
time of Bruce-Umbraugh’s arrest heads, and is a self-admitted member of, a neo-
Nazi organization which is described as “a terroristic national socialist organization 
that believes in using violence for ‘apocalyptic, racial cleansing.’”93  In September 
2019, Seattle police had confiscated the driver’s guns under the State’s red-flag 
law;94 prosecutors believe that he had “participated in recent firearm training and 
recruitment efforts at ‘hate camps,’ which . . . . he helped organize” and was 
stockpiling “an alarming number of weapons,” potentially for a “massacre.”95  The 
Seattle Times states that the driver in the vehicle with Bruce-Umbraugh was legally 
prohibited from possessing firearms.96  Bruce-Umbraugh likewise identifies as a 
neo-Nazi and affiliates with the same neo-Nazi organization.97  Since possessing a 
firearm in Texas and affiliating with individuals and organizations advocating for 
“race wars,” generally are not crimes, the only laws between Bruce-Umbaugh and 
his weapons are 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(3) and federal or state drug possession charges 
(interestingly, it appears prosecutors only charged the unlawful firearm 
possession).98  While Bruce-Umbaugh’s attorney correctly states that “a citizen 
accused of a crime should be judged on his or her actions and the facts of the case, 
not upon alleged associations which should be protected by the First Amendment,” 
the violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(3) appears to be a  rather open-and-shut case 
 
92   See Clarridge, supra note 88 (“Federal prosecutors are committed to enforcing our nation’s 
gun laws to keep communities safe,” said U.S. Attorney Nealy Cox. “As a drug user, this defendant 
should never have been allowed to possess firearms.”); see also Suspected Neo-Nazi charged with gun 
crime in Texas (Nov. 15, 2019) https://apnews.com/bff1cca328104d37a4337081f90a5f6e. 
93   Phil Helsel, Guns seized from Washington man said to be neo-Nazi leader prepping for 'race 
war' (last updated Oct. 19, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/guns-seized-washington-
man-said-be-neo-nazi-leader-prepping-n1068956. 
94   Stockler, supra note 90. 
95   Helsel, supra note 91. 
96   Clarridge, supra note 88.  
97 Clarridge, Suspected Neo-Nazi Charged With Gun Crime, supra note 88 (“In jailhouse phone 
calls, Bruce-Umbaugh allegedly referenced his affiliation with ‘the group’ and discussed a photo taken 
of him and another AtomWaffen Division member at the Auschwitz concentration camp, prosecutors 
said at the detention hearing.”). 
98   It appears that § 922 is unofficially part of the bulwark used against terrorist groups. Notably, 
prosecutors used § 922 as a lead charge in four or more domestic terrorism prosecutions from 2013 to 
2017 although it is not listed as a predicate offense in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, and prosecutors likewise 
used it to prosecute hate crime incidents from 2013 to 2017 although it is not included in the five federal 
hate crimes laws identified by the Justice Department. Figs 2 & 4. https://www.brennancenter 
.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Wrong_Priorities_Terrorism.pdf Cf. United States v. Hasson, 
No. GJH-19-96, 2019 WL 4573424, at *8 (D. Md. Sept. 20, 2019). 
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where Bruce-Umbraugh admitted to regular unlawful use of a controlled substance 
over a long period of time.99 
 
D. Historical Note on the Statutory Amendments 
 
The Gun Control Act of 1968 originally made it illegal for a person “who is an 
unlawful user of or addicted to marihuana or any depressant or stimulant drug (as 
defined in section 201(v) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act)100 or narcotic 
drug (as defined in section 4731(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954)101” to 
possess a firearm.102  The current version of the law states that a person who “is an 
unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance (as defined in section 102 
of the Controlled Substances Act[]” is prohibited from possessing a firearm.103 
The Controlled Substances Act was passed on October 27, 1970 and became 
effective May 1, 1971.104  The CSA repealed the sections in the GCA pertaining to 
the FDCA and the Internal Revenue Code.105  Even so, § 922(g)(3) did not 
 
99   Stockler, supra note 90. 
100  “Depressant or stimulant drug [means] any drug which contains any quantity of (A) 
barbituric acid or any of the salts of barbituric acid; or (B) any derivative of barbituric acid which has 
been designated by the Secretary under section 352(d) of this title as habit forming; (2) any drug which 
contains any quantity of (A) amphetamine or any of its optical isomers; (B) any salt of amphetamine 
or any salt of an optical isomer of amphetamine, or (C) any substance which the Secretary, after 
investigation, has found to be, and by regulation designated as, habit forming because of its stimulant 
effect on the central nervous system; or (3) any drug which contains any quantity of a substance which 
the Secretary, after investigation, has found to have, and by regulation designates as having, a potential 
for abuse because of its depressant or stimulant effect on the central nervous system or its 
hallucinogenic effect; except that the Secretary shall not designate under this paragraph, or under clause 
(C) of subparagraph (2), any substance that is now included, or is hereafter included, within the 
classifications stated in section 4731, and marihuana as defined in section 4761 of Title 26." Deyo v. 
United States, 396 F.2d 595, 595 n.1 (1968). Cf. 21 U.S.C. § 802(9), definition of “depressant or 
stimulant substance.” 
101  “The words ‘narcotic drugs’ as used in this part shall mean any of the following, whether 
produced directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of vegetable origin, or independently by 
means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis: (1) Opium, 
isonipecaine, coca leaves, and opiate; (2) Any compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, or preparation 
of opium, isonipecaine, coca leaves, or opiate; (3) Any substance (and any compound, manufacture, 
salt, derivative, or preparation thereof) which is chemically identical with any of the substances referred 
to in clauses (1) and (2).” 26 U.S.C. § 4731(a) (1958). Cf. 21 U.S.C. § 802(17), definition of “narcotic 
drug.” 
102  18 U.S.C § 922(g)(3) (1970), Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 922(h)(3), 82 Stat. 1221. 
103  18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) (2019). 
104  See 18 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.; Pub. L. No. 91-513. 
105  Pub. L. No. 91-513. “Sections 201(v), 301(q), and 511 of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321(v), 331(q), 360(a) are repealed.” 84 Stat. 1281; “Subchapter A of chapter 
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incorporate the Controlled Substances Act until 1986 with the passage of the Firearm 
Owners Protection Act.106  After the passage of the CSA—but before it was formally 
incorporated into the GCA—courts would look to definitions in the CSA to construe 
§922(g)(3).107 
There is sparse case law applying § 922(g)(3) between 1970 and 1986. It is 
possible that the lack of enforcement played a factor in delaying the amendment of 
the GCA—or perhaps it is the opposite: that the failure to incorporate the CSA into 
the GCA hindered enforcement of § 922(g)(3). 
 
39 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to narcotic drugs and marihuana) is repealed.” 84 
Stat. 1292. 
106  Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 102(6)(B), 100 Stat. 452 substituted “is an” for “who is an” and “any 
controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (U.S.C. § 802));” for 
“marihuana or any depressant or stimulant drug (as defined in section 201(v) of the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act) or narcotic drug (as defined in section 4731(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1954[.]” 
107  See United States v. Ocegueda, 564 F.2d 1363, 1364 n.3 (9th Cir. 1977) (referencing the law 
as it appears in the Federal Register—federally prohibited persons are listed in § 922(h)) 
(“Section 922(h)(3) refers to 26 U.S.C. § 4731(a) for a definition of “narcotic drug.” [Section 4731(a)] 
was repealed by Public Law 91-513, Title III, § 1101(b)(3)(A), October 27, 1970, 84 Stat. 1292. Public 
Law 91-153 [sic] enacted 21 U.S.C. § 802(16), which defines heroin as a narcotic drug, just as it was 
defined in 26 U.S.C. § 4731(a). Section 922[g](3) therefore should be read to refer to 21 U.S.C. § 
802(16).”) (emphasis added). See also United States v. Bivona, 487 F.2d 443, 444 n.1 (2d Cir. 1973) 
(determining that acts occurring after the enactment, but before the effective date of the CSA were not 
governed by the CSA) (“We note that the statutory provisions charged in the indictment were repealed 
by §[§] 1101(b)(3)(A) and (b)(4)(A) of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 
1970, 84 Stat. 1292. The effective date of the 1970 Act was May 1, 1971. Since the events alleged here 
occurred in January 1971, the old statute governs prosecution and sentencing.”). 
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E. Constitutionality of Federal Disarmament Under §922(g)(3) 
 
The Fourth,108 Fifth,109 Seventh,110 Eighth,111 Ninth,112 and Tenth Circuits113 
have upheld the constitutionality of §922(g)(3) against Second Amendment 
challenges. Similarly, federal district courts routinely uphold the constitutionality of 
the statute against Second Amendment challenges.114 
One recent Ninth Circuit case is illustrative. In Wilson v. Lynch,115 a state 
marijuana registry cardholder in Nevada brought a challenge to §922(g)(3) as 
violating her constitutional rights, but the court ruled she lacked standing to proceed 
with this claim.116  The plaintiff did not claim that she was an unlawful drug user or 
addict, or even that she owned a gun; in other words, she could not show that the 
statute had injured her in any way.117  There was also no evidence of imminent 
 
108  See United States v. Yates, 746 Fed. Appx. 162 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 616 
(2018) (unreported) (per curiam); United States v. Carter, 750 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 2014), cert denied, 
574 U.S. 907 (2014). 
109  See United States v. May, 538 Fed. Appx. 465 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Patterson, 
431 F.3d 832, 68 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1128 (5th Cir. 2005). 
110  United States v. Cook, 914 F.3d 545 (7th Cir. 2019); U.S. v. Thomas, 426 Fed. Appx. 459 
(7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
111  United States v. Jacobson, 406 Fed. Appx. 91 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); United States v. 
Seay, 620 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2010). 
112  United States v. Dugan, 657 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2011), for additional opinion, see 450 Fed. 
Appx. 633 (9th Cir. 2011). 
113  United States v. Richard, 350 Fed. Appx. 252 (10th Cir. 2009). 
114  See United States v. Westley, 2018 WL 1832912 (D. Conn. 2018); United States v. Bruce, 
2016 WL 3580636 (D.S.D. 2016); United States v. Matthews, 2015 WL 2170380 (W.D. Mo. 2015); 
Gibson v. Holder, 2015 WL 5635125 (N.D. Fla. 2015), report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 
5634596 (N.D. Fla. 2015); United States v. Conrad, 923 F. Supp. 2d 843 (W.D. Va. 2013); Roberge v. 
United States, 2013 WL 4052926 (E.D. Tenn. 2013); Fausnaught v. United States, 2013 WL 12333443 
(M.D. Pa. 2013); Nodine v. United States, 2012 WL 4711882 (S.D. Ala. 2012), report and 
recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 4739949 (S.D. Ala. 2012); United States v. Emond, 2012 WL 
4964506 (D. Me. 2012); United States v. Korbe, 2010 WL 2404394 (W.D. Pa. 2010); United States v. 
Barrett, 2010 WL 3767607 (W.D. Wis. 2010); United States v. Hendrix, 2010 WL 1372663 (W.D. 
Wis. 2010); United States v. Stacy, 2010 WL 4117276 (S.D. Cal. 2010); United States v. Bumm, 2009 
WL 1073659 (S.D. W. Va. 2009); Piscitello v. Bragg, 2009 WL 536898 (W.D. Tex. 2009); U.S. v. 
Lacy, 2009 WL 3756987 (E.D. Wis. 2009); United States v. Hendrix, 2009 WL 3816970 (W.D. Wis. 
2009); United States v. Lyles, 2009 WL 650182 (N.D. Cal. 2009); United States v. Prince, 2009 WL 
1875709 (D. Kan. 2009), order rev’d on other grounds, 593 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2010); United States 
v. Chafin, 2008 WL 4951028 (S.D. W. Va. 2008); United States v. Dugan, 2008 WL 11358024 (N.D. 
Cal. 2008). 
115  835 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1396 (2017). 
116  See id. 
117  See Wilson, 835 F.3d at 1090. 
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prosecution.118  The Ninth Circuit also held that § 922(g)(3) did not violate the 
Second Amendment;119 using a two-tiered intermediate scrutiny, the Court 
concluded that there was a substantial government interest in preventing gun 
violence, that research data and other evidence suggested a robust link between drug 
use and gun violence, and that federal lawmakers could reasonably presume that a 
registrant for legal marijuana usage was, in fact, likely to use marijuana. 
Unrelated to the Second Amendment issues, a number of defendants have 
challenged § 922(g)(3) as being unconstitutionally vague.120  The vagueness of the 
term “unlawful user” has been an ongoing point of contention for pro-gun advocates 
and marijuana legalization proponents.121  The current consensus in the federal 
courts is that the government must demonstrate a temporal nexus between the drug 
use and the firearm possession in order to demonstrate a violation, in which case 
there is no as-is vagueness of constitutional import.122  An illustrative case is United 
 
118  See id. at 1090. 
119  See Wilson, 835 F.3d at 1091-95. 
120  See, e.g., United States v. Moss, 2019 WL 3215960 at *2-*4 (D.Conn. July 17, 
2019)(rejecting vagueness challenge); see also Robert Batey, Vagueness and the Construction of 
Criminal Statutes: Balancing Acts, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 1, 72 n. 339 (1997)(discussing United 
States v. Reed, 924 F. Supp. 1052 (D. Kan. 1996), rev'd, 114 F.3d 1067 (10th Cir. 1997), an early case 
discussing the vagueness issues in § 922(g)(3)). 
121  See Ira P. Robbins, Guns N’ Ganja, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1783, 1803 (2018). Unfortunately, 
legislative history does not provide clarity as to the meaning of an “unlawful user” except as a means 
to “keep firearms out of the hands of ‘presumptively risky people.’”  Id. (quoting Dickerson v. New 
Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 111 n.6 (1983)). Interestingly, Robbins notes in her article that the 
Gun Control Act did not originally mention marijuana until 1968 when it widened the scope to 
encompass “unlawful user or addicted to marijuana” and later replaced marijuana ambiguously with 
“unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance.”  Id. n.85. The lack of clarity among the 
lower courts forced the judiciary to create a test that “confined their focus on two factors: (1) the 
regularity of the drug use, and (2) the contemporaneous possession of the drug and firearm.”  Id. at 
1805 (citing United States v. Augustin, 376 F.3d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 2004)). However, this test resulted 
in the following downfalls: 
While the test seeks to define unlawful user, it fails to expressly include unlawful use in its 
analysis; courts solely focus on the “judicially created temporal nexus” between gun 
possession and drug use. By conflating an element of the analysis with the analysis itself, 
courts omit the integral factor of unlawful use. Therefore, the test is more aptly 
characterized as (1) the unlawful possession or use of a drug, pursuant to the CSA; (2) the 
regularity of the drug use; and (3) the contemporaneous possession of the drug and a 
firearm. 
Id. 
122  See, e.g., Id.; United States v. Cook, 914 F.3d 545, 549–55 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 
judgment vacated, __ U.S. __ (2019) (remanding for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in  Rehaif v. United States, __ U.S. __,  139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019); United States v. Bramer, 832 
F.3d 908 (8th Cir. 2016) (per curiam); U.S. v. Purdy, 264 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejected the 
defendant’s vagueness challenge); United States v. Blackard, 2020 WL 353239 (W.D. Missouri Jan. 
21, 2020), United States v. Stupka, 2019 WL 6000374 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 10, 2019); United States v. 
Kimbrough, 319 F. Supp. 3d 912 (M.D. Tenn. 2018) (§ 922(g)(3) not facially void for vagueness); 
United States v. Holmes, 2016 WL 54918 (E.D. Wis. 2016) (unreported) (noting that courts have added 
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States v. Bramer,123 in which the Eighth Circuit ruled that the term “unlawful user” 
was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant’s conduct of using 
marijuana while possessing a firearm.124  A facial challenge to the constitutionality 
of the statute requires the defendant to provide evidence that the term was “vague as 
applied to his particular conduct.”125  While the court acknowledges that the 
defendant need not prove vagueness in all applications, the defendant failed to meet 
his burden of proof with respect to the present circumstance.126  Moreover, the 
defendant’s admission of “knowingly possessing firearms while being an unlawful 
user of marijuana,” was dispositive for denying the defendant’s challenge.127 
 
III. LEGAL MARIJUANA & GUN POSSESSION 
 
A. ATF Guidance Documents and Enforcement 
 
In September 2011, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 
released an Open Letter to All Federal Firearms Licensees128 (FFL’s) providing 
guidance as to the intent of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) and its interaction with state laws 
that legalize marijuana in some way. In particular, the guidance document reminds 
FFL’s that the Controlled Substances Act lists marijuana as a Schedule I controlled 
substance “and there are no exceptions in Federal law for . . . . medicinal purposes, 
even if such use is sanctioned by State law,” the use of marijuana qualifies an 
individual under federal law as an “unlawful user” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 
§922(g)(3).129  Since 1996, at least thirty-three states and the District of Columbia 
have legalized medical marijuana.130  The essential features of the 2011 Open Letter 
remained in the related “Cole Memorandum”131 regarding marijuana dispensaries, 
though the Cole Memorandum did not focus on firearm enforcement. 
 
a temporal element; every circuit to have considered the question has required drug use 
contemporaneous with the firearm possession); U.S. v. Matthews, 2015 WL 2170380 (W.D. Mo. 2015) 
(unreported) (court rejected vagueness challenge brought before trial). 
123  832 F.3d 908 (8th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). 
124  See id. at 909–910. 
125  Id. at 909. 
126  Id. 
127  Id. 
128  Open Letter to All Federal Firearms Licensees, supra note 9. 
129  Id. 
130  See State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 16, 2019) 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx. 
131  See Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. James M. Cole, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, on 
Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ 
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In January 2018, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued the “Sessions 
Memorandum,” a policy announcement rescinding all previous guidance regarding 
prosecutions in medical marijuana states, deferring instead to nebulous “well-
established general principles” which included considerations such as “the deterrent 
effect of criminal prosecution.”132  This superseded prior DOJ policy which focused 
prosecutions, in relevant part, in “[p]reventing violence and the use of firearms in 
the cultivation and distributions of marijuana” and deferring to state and local law 
enforcement for activity beyond the stated scope of DOJ priorities.133  The rescission 
created uncertainty for relevant parties, and it is unclear how the shift in DOJ 
directives after the 2018 memorandum has impacted federal prosecutions of gun 
possession prosecutions under §922(g)(3) in states with medical marijuana and 
legalized marijuana, however 2017 statistics indicate that the number of 
prosecutions under §922(g) generally had already begun to increase following a 
decline in the period from 2013 to 2015 (the timeframe after the Cole memorandum 
through the end of the sitting administration).134  Given the growing recalcitrance 
among some big city prosecutors to charge for mere possession of marijuana without 
aggravating factors indicating dealing, the federal prosecutors’ directives appear to 
be going in a different direction than at least some state prosecutors in areas having 
the highest incident rates.135 
William P. Barr became Attorney General in 2019, and announced that he 
supports “the prosecutorial priorities” that were put in place by the Sessions 
Memorandum—which included an emphasis on “violent crime, drugs, immigration, 
 
resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf (also available https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ justice-
department-announces-update-marijuana-enforcement-policy). 
132  Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Jefferson B. Sessions, III, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, on Marijuana 
Enforcement (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1022196/download (also 
available https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-issues-memo-marijuana-enforcement). 
133  See Cole Memorandum, supra note 131, also available at https://www.justice.gov/ 
iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf. 
134  U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, QUICK FACTS ON FELON IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM, (2018) 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-
facts/Felon_in_Possession_FY17.pdf. 
135  Shaila Dewan, A Growing Chorus of Big City Prosecutors Say No to Marijuana Convictions, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/29/us/baltimore-marijuana-possession. 
html (“[I]ncreasingly, another argument is creeping in: letting marijuana cases go actually makes 
communities safer, by shifting the focus to stopping violence and untangling a legacy of racial 
discrimination, allowing the seeds of trust to germinate in neighborhoods where a chief complaint of 
police officers is that no one will help them solve crimes.”). See also Fair & Just Prosecution, 21 
Principles for the 21st Century Prosecutor, at 9, 11 (2018), https://fairandjustprosecution.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/12/FJP_21Principles_Interactive-w-destinations.pdf. 
236   OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW  Vol: 18.1:211 
 
and national security.”136  The DOJ appears to have turned more of its attention to 
the prosecution of firearms offenses.137  On November 8, 2019, Barr announced the 
launch of Project Guardian.138  This program’s objective is to reduce violent crime 
and enforce federal firearms laws across the country.139  Project Guardian calls on 
federal prosecutors to work with state and local authorities to strengthen their 
firearms prosecution strategy.140  This involves ensuring effective operation of NICS 
and improving information-sharing by ATF when a prohibited individual attempts 
to purchase a firearm and is denied by the NICS.141  Federal prosecutors and law 
enforcement coordinate with state, local, and tribal law enforcement and prosecutors 
to consider potential federal prosecution for new cases involving suspects arrested 
while in possession of a firearm, who use a firearm to commit violent crimes and 
drug trafficking, or who commit violent crimes for criminal organizations.142 
The next month, AG Barr also launched Operation Relentless Pursuit, a 
program to provide federal resources to state and local law enforcement in an effort 
to reduce violent crime in “designated high impact areas.”143  At least $71 million in 
federal grant funding will go toward increasing the number of federal law 
enforcement officers in seven urban centers with high rates of violent crime: 
Albuquerque, Baltimore, Cleveland, Detroit, Kansas City, Memphis, and 
Milwaukee.144  The goal of Operation Relentless Pursuit, like Project Guardian, is a 
reduction in gun violence—and drug trafficking often begets gun violence. The DEA 
will utilize this targeted surge of resources to enhance its ability to make these cities 
 
136  Statement of William P. Barr, United States Attorney’s Conference. 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-opening-remarks-us-
attorneys-conference. 
137  Statement of William P. Barr, Attorney General, before the U. S. Senate Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies, FY 2020 Budget Request, April 
10, 2019, https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/04.10.19--Barr%20Testimony.pdf. 
Prosecutions under § 922(g) are at an all-time high. Convictions under § 922(g) have risen every year 
since 2015. https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-facts/Felon_ 
In_Possession_FY18.pdf. 
138  Attorney General William P. Barr, Memorandum to All United States Attorneys, All Heads 
of Department Components, and All Law Enforcement Agencies: Project Guardian (Nov. 8, 2019). 
139  See id. 
140  See id. 
141  See id. 
142  See id. 
143  See DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ANNOUNCEMENT OF OPERATION RELENTLESS PURSUIT, 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-william-p-barr-announces-launch-operation-
relentless-pursuit (Dec. 18, 2019). 
144  See id. Detroit is the only city on this list that is in a state where recreational marijuana is 
legal. 
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safer by working with state and local partners to pursue the worst offenders.145  Note, 
however, that marijuana does not receive specific mention.146 
In twenty-two states, ATF allows licensed firearm dealers to accept a state 
concealed pistol license in lieu of a federal background check, because those states 
have concealed-carry permit requirements at least as stringent as the federal 
background check requirements.147  Michigan was one of these states from 2006 
until the end of 2019, but the state legalized recreational marijuana sales starting in 
December 2019; on March 3, 2020, the Acting Director of ATF issued a Public 
Safety Advisory to all licensed firearm dealers in Michigan, effectively revoking 
this substitution in Michigan.148  All licensed gun dealers in Michigan must now 
conduct NICS background checks for all firearm sales, even if the purchaser has a 
valid concealed-carry permit. 
 
B. Gun Permits & Licenses for Lawful Marijuana Users 
 
Four months before the 2011 ATF Open Letter, Oregon’s highest court, sitting 
en banc, decided Willis v. Winters,149 which consolidated several cases regarding the 
State’s firearm licensing statute and its interaction with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). The 
court held that the federal prohibition on firearm possession “by persons who, under 
federal law, are ‘unlawful user[s] of a controlled substance,’” does not preempt the 
state’s licensing statute.150  The Oregon Medical Marijuana Act authorizes medical 
marijuana use and requires registration of such authorized users.151  Additionally, 
the Oregon code makes it unlawful to carry a concealed weapon on one’s person or 
in one’s car,152 except that §166.260(1)(i) provides that such unlawful prohibition 
shall not apply to licensed persons.153  Oregon has a “shall issue” regime for 
 
145  DOJ Press Release (Dec. 18, 2019), available at https://www.dea.gov/press-
releases/2019/12/18/attorney-general-william-p-barr-announces-launch-operation-relentless. Those 
arrested for simple marijuana possession are unlikely to fall in the category of “worst offenders of gun 
violence,” the intended target of the Operation. 
146  Fentanyl and methamphetamine receive specific mention in the announcement. 
147  See ATF, Permanent Brady Chart, https://www.atf.gov/rules-and-regulations/permanent-
brady-permit-chart (updated March 3, 2020). 
148  Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Public Safety Advisory to All 
Michigan Federal Firearms Licensees, March 3, 2020, available at https://www.atf.gov/firearms/ 
docs/open-letter/public-advisory-all-michigan-ffls-03-03-20/download. 
149  See Willis v. Winters, 253 P.3d 1058 (Ore. 2011). 
150  Id. at 1060. 
151  Id. 
152  Id. See also OR. REV. STAT. § 166.250(1)(a), (b) (2017). 
153  Willis, 253 P.3d at 1060. Note that the opinion cites to OR. REV. STAT. § 166.260(1)(h) which, 
seems to be a typo or scrivener’s error – the provision the court references is in § 166.260(1)(i). 
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concealed handgun licenses: “the sheriff . . . shall issue . . . a concealed handgun 
license” to persons that meet a provided list of standards.154  Several sheriffs denied 
concealed-carry license (CHL) applications and renewals submitted by medical 
marijuana registrants, despite their full compliance with the state’s statutory 
standards for licensing, on the premise that § 922(g)(3) preempted the state’s 
licensing statute, therefore issuance of a license under the circumstances violated § 
922(a)(6) and § 922(t)(3).155  The court held that under Oregon’s statute, sheriffs are 
duty-bound “to issue CHLs to qualified applicants, without regard to the applicant’s 
use of medical marijuana.”156  Because the licensing statute proscribes the 
concealment of firearms and “is not directly concerned with the possession of 
firearms,” it does not interfere with the full enforcement of the federal statute.157 
It is possible that the sheriffs in this case could themselves enforce section 
922(g)(3) of the federal Gun Control Act against medical marijuana users who 
possess guns in violation of federal law. The federal act makes such possession 
illegal; the sheriffs generally are authorized to enforce federal as well as state law, 
and no state law prohibits the sheriffs from taking such enforcement actions. But it 
appears that the sheriffs also wish to enforce the federal policy of keeping guns out 
of the hands of marijuana users by using the state licensing mechanism to deny 
CHLs to medical marijuana users. The problem that the sheriffs have encountered is 
that Congress has not enacted a law requiring license denial as a means of enforcing 
the policy that underlies the federal law, and the state has adopted a licensing statute 
that manifests a policy decision not to use its gun licensing mechanism for that 
purpose: state law requires sheriffs to issue concealed gun licenses without regard 
to whether the applicants use medical marijuana.158 
In other words, the sheriffs cannot deny concealed handgun licenses to medical 
marijuana registrants, but they are free to arrest those registrants if they do, in fact, 
possess a handgun. Federal law does not mandate the use of state gun licensing 
schemes in enforcing § 922(g)(3), nor, the court held, could Congress do so without 
commandeering “the policy-making and enforcement apparatus of the states.”159  
This decision remains good law in Oregon. 
 
154  Id. at 1060–61; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 166.291, 166.292 (2017). 
155  Willis, 253 P.3d at 1062, 1067. The sheriffs asserted that issuing licenses to registered 
medicinal marijuana users specifically violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) which prohibits lying on a 
firearm background check form or deceiving a licensed gun dealer during a sale. 
156  Id. at 1068. 
157  Id. at 1066. 
158  See id. 
159  Id. The court also held that of the three preemption scenarios established by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, “[o]nly the third type of preemption—preemption implied from an actual conflict—is relevant 
in the present case. That is so because the Gun Control Act of 1968 (the federal statute at issue) 
expressly renounces any Congressional intent to preempt state law unless the law is in “direct and 
positive” conflict with the Act. 18 U.S.C. § 927. Id. at 1063. Because the “clear and manifest purpose 
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The case is remarkable for two reasons: (1) it provides a potential road map to 
other state legislatures about how they can liberalize marijuana laws and the 
licensing for handgun carrying to avoid licensing federally defined “unlawful 
users”160 and (2) it gives rise to serious concerns about the realities of enforcement 
and efficiency in states with permissive gun laws (and generally) because although 
the court’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. §922(a)(6) and (t)(3) is perhaps legally 
accurate, it disregarded the sheriffs’ assertion regarding the realities of gun sellers 
and ignored the tacit concerns of law enforcement officers regarding enforcement 
and efficiency frustrated by issuing licenses. 
The Willis decision garnered attention from both marijuana advocates and pro-
gun advocates, but other cases since then have been trending in the other direction, 
and the federal classification of marijuana as a Schedule I drug under the Controlled 
Substances Act continues to give concern to the courts and create confusion for 
firearm owners seeking to lawfully use medical marijuana in the thirty-three states161 
that have legalized its use. For a recent example, in Bradley v. United States,162 a 
gunowner wanted to register for Ohio’s medical marijuana program and claimed that 
§922(g)(3) prevented him from doing so, thereby violating his Second Amendment 
rights, as well as the Equal Protection clause. Bradley was diagnosed with post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) but was barred by federal law from participating 
in Ohio’s medical marijuana program because he was in possession of a firearm.163  
 
of Congress” expressed in 18 U.S.C. § 927 was to limit federal preemption to state law “in ‘direct and 
positive’ conflict with the Act,” and under §922(g)(3), the “purpose is to make [firearm possession] a 
crime for all marijuana users,” the prohibition on concealed carry does not “stand as on obstacle” to 
the Gun Control Act of 1968 and thus is not preempted by it. Id. at 1062–65. In particular, 18 U.S.C. § 
927 provides that “[n]o provision . . . shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of the 
Congress to occupy the field in which such provision operates to the exclusion of the law of any State 
on the same subject matter, unless there is a direct and positive conflict between such provision and 
the law of the State so that the two cannot be reconciled or consistently stand together.”  18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 927 (2019). 
160  Although the courts of other permissive gun licensing states might not similarly construe 
their own statutes. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision but, in paraphrasing 
the Court of Appeals holding, the high court seemed to vindicate and implicate preemption issues in 
one breath: “Oregon's concealed handgun licensing statute is not preempted by federal law, because it 
does not affirmatively authorize what the federal statute prohibits—i.e., possession of firearms by 
unlawful drug users—but, instead, merely exempts licensees from state criminal liability for the 
possession of a concealed handgun.”  Willis, 253 P.3d at 1062–63 (2011). 
161  See Jeremy Berke and Sky Gould, Legal Marijuana Just Went on Sale in Illinois. Here Are 
All the States Where Cannabis is Legal, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 1, 2020) https://www.businessinsider. 
com/legal-marijuana-states-2018-1. Currently, eleven states have legalized recreational marijuana use 
for adults over the age of 21 and thirty-three states have legalized medical marijuana. The federal 
government appears to be moving in the same direction as President Donald Trump legalized hemp, an 
ingredient of cannabis-infused products. Id. 
162  402 F.Supp.3d 398 (N.D. Ohio, Aug. 14, 2019). 
163  See id. at 400. 
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The court rejected his claims, in part because he faced no imminent threat of 
prosecution (lacked standing) and partly because his Second Amendment claim was 
implausible. The court cited numerous cases from other district and circuit courts 
consistently holding that §922(g)(3) did not violate the Second Amendment,164 
including situations where marijuana consumption would have been legal under 
state law, yet the courts affirmed “the constitutionality of §922(g)(3) under the 
Second Amendment”165 in that context. 
The Sixth Circuit reached the same conclusion in United States v. Bellamy,166 
holding that §922(g)(3) applied even if defendant held a state-issued medical 
marijuana card. At the same time, Bellamy did not include a Second Amendment 
claim, but was decided on statutory and preemption grounds. 
 
C. Medical Marijuana Registries and NICS 
 
Although HIPAA does not explicitly protect medical marijuana registries, it 
would be possible to argue against NICS reporting of medical marijuana users 
because there is no express provision for it, in contrast to the express regulatory 
provision that provides for the disclosure for mental health concerns, permitting 
reporting of  “protected health information for purposes of reporting to the National 
Instant Criminal Background Check System the identity of an individual who is 
prohibited from possessing a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4).”167  Under the 
language of the law, HIPAA’s privacy rule only applies to the electronic 
transmission of health information by a “covered entity.”168  State registries do not 
appear to qualify as a “covered entity,”169 although HIPAA’s privacy rule may 
 
164  See id. at 403–05. 
165  Id. at 404 (quoting United States v. Carter, 750 F.3d 462, 470 (4th Cir. 2014)). For another 
example of courts going the opposite direction from the Oregon court, see Gibson v. Holder, 2015 WL 
5635125 at *12 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2015) (rejecting a Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(3) by 
medical marijuana cardholder). 
166  682 Fed.Appx. 447 (6th Cir. 2017). 
167  45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (k)(7). For an excellent discussion, see Stephanie E. Pearl, HIPAA: 
Caught in the Cross Fire, 64 DUKE L.J. 559 (2014) (discussing proposed HHS rule “that would grant 
an exception to HIPAA’s privacy protection to allow the reporting of relevant mental-health records to 
NICS.”). 
168  45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014). 
169  That is, “(1) A health plan, (2) A healthcare clearinghouse, (3) A healthcare provider who 
transmits any health information in electronic form in connection with a transaction covered by this 
subchapter.”  Id. “Healthcare provider” includes physicians, nurses, pharmacists, hospitals, and clinics 
if such person or entity “furnishes, bills, or is paid for health care in the normal course of business.” Id. 
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protect doctors who prescribe medical marijuana in such states.170  Consistent with 
the fact that federal law criminalizes the use of marijuana, a Schedule I controlled 
substance, HIPAA remains silent on protections for (federally illegal) medical 
marijuana usage. Perhaps the best argument is that federal law does not protect 
practices that are illegal under federal law. 
The real issue with medical marijuana registry reporting to the NICS database 
lies in the state laws promulgated to allow medical marijuana.171  State privacy 
protections for medical marijuana registrants create reporting gaps with NICS for 
verifying conflicts with 922(g)(3) and results in what Ohio dubbed “the honor 
system” in gun acquisition by marijuana registrants.172  While some registrants 
facially challenge the law to no avail,173 those who purchase a firearm despite their 
status as a federally unlawful user likely face no consequences without additional 
aggravating factors to incentivize their prosecution.174  As ATF explained in the 
Federal Register: 
“A number of commenters expressed concern about the disclosure of personal 
information to NICS by States and Federal agencies. Commenters also expressed 
doubt that agencies can retrieve relevant data based upon the definitions in this 
regulation . . . . It is recognized, however, that any disclosure of information to 
NICS must comply with all applicable Federal and State privacy laws.”175 
Given the increase in emphasis on NICS reporting, and the increase in numbers 
of active records for drug users, one could infer that more medical care providers 
are beginning to provide names to NICS. 
 
170  See Rita M. Marcoux, et al. Medical Marijuana and Related Legal Aspects, 38 PHARM. & 
THERAPEUTICS 612 (Oct. 2013), available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3875249/ 
pdf/ptj3810612.pdf. 
171  GOGGINS & STRICKLAND, supra note 17 (“[T]he problem lies in a direct conflict between a 
state statute that explicitly prohibits the sharing of data about those licensed for use of medical 
marijuana with any other agency, state or federal.”). 
172  Josh Sweigart, How Will Ohio Know Gun Owners Don’t Use Medical Pot? The Honor 
System, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Feb. 5, 2018) https://www.daytondailynews.com/news/state--regional-
govt--politics/how-will-ohio-know-gun-owners-don-use-medical-pot-the-honor-
system/l3cJ2kYisnc0xKc2ZjMNZM/amp.html. 
173  See Bradley v. United States, No. 1:19 CV 284, 2019 WL 3818661, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 
14, 2019) (holding the gun owner lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(3) where he had not registered for medical marijuana use for fear of violating the firearm 
possession statute). 
174  At least this is true in the case of delayed denials in firearm acquisitions. “USAOs generally 
do not accept and prosecute denial cases that do not involve aggravating circumstances.”  U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-18-440, LAW ENFORCEMENT: FEW INDIVIDUALS DENIED FIREARMS 
PURCHASES ARE PROSECUTED AND ATF SHOULD ASSESS USE OF WARNING NOTICES IN LIEU OF 
PROSECUTIONS, at 21 (2018).  State denial prosecutions likewise are “generally based on aggravating 
circumstances in addition to criminal records.” Id. at 30. 
175  T.D. ATF-391, supra note 61.  
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IV. ALCOHOL: THE MISSING PIECE OF THIS PUZZLE 
 
Many of the policy reasons for prohibiting users of illegal drugs from owning 
firearms would seem to apply equally, if not more, to alcohol abuse, but federal law 
ignores alcohol abuse in its list of prohibiting factors in §922(g).176  Alcohol is not a 
controlled substance, of course, so the illegality of using the latter distinguishes it 
from the former, especially from a political standpoint. In addition, due to the 
illegality of controlled substances, illegal drug users may be more likely than alcohol 
users to interact regularly with violent street gangs, or at least violent dealers, and 
removing guns from one side of the transaction can lower the risk of disagreements 
escalating into shootings. Even so, several prominent experts on firearm policy 
advocate for adding alcohol abusers to the list of federally prohibited persons, and 
some states have done this in one form or another.177  Suicides make up roughly two-
thirds of the gun fatalities of every year,178 and these gun deaths disproportionately 
involve either a history of alcohol abuse, alcohol abuse at the time of the self-
inflicted gunshot wound, or both. Interestingly, empirical studies also indicate that 
firearm owners are more likely to abuse alcohol or become alcoholics.179 
Alcohol-related gun violence is more lethal than car crashes, according to one 
recent study.180  Furthermore, alcohol-drinkers can even impact non-alcohol drinkers 
living in the same home by  increasing the likelihood of homicide.181  We lack a 
federal regulation even against the use or purchase of firearms while intoxicated.182  
States must bear the responsibility of implementing laws to “close a glaring gap in 
federal law that makes it easier for guns to fall into the wrong hands.”183 
 
176  See Katherine A. Vittes, et al., Reconsidering the Adequacy of Current Conditions on Legal 
Firearm Ownership, in REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 68–70 (Daniel W. Webster ed., Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2013) (noting that empirical research suggests alcohol abusers are just as 
strongly associated with perpetrating or suffering gun violence as drug users). 
177  See, e.g., Garen J. Wintemute, Broadening Denial Criteria for the Purchase and Possession 
of Firearms: Need, Feasibility, and Effectiveness, in REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 82–88 
(Daniel W. Webster ed., Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013) (surveying other sources and studies). 
178  See Gun Violence Statistics, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://lawcenter.giffords.org/facts/gun-
violence-statistics (last visited Oct. 10, 2020). 
179  See Vittes, et al., supra note 176, at 69 (surveying studies on this point). 
180  Lisa Dunn, Alcohol Misuse and Gun Violence: What We Know, GUNS & AMERICA (Dec. 
2017) https://gunsandamerica.org/story/19/12/17/relationship-between-alcohol-gun-violence/. 
181  Id. 
182  Id. See also Brendan G. Carr, et al., A Review of Legislation Restricting the Intersection of 
Firearms and Alcohol in the U.S., 125 PUB. HEALTH REP. 674 (2010). 
183  See Firearm Prohibitions, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-
areas/who-can-have-a-gun/categories-of-prohibited-people/ (last visited Oct 10, 2020). 
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A. Policy Considerations with Alcohol & Guns 
 
Research confirms that “heavily consuming alcohol can lower inhibitions, 
increase confidence, and potentially release violent inclinations.”184  The majority 
of domestic violence homicides occur while the abuser is intoxicated, and 
approximately 60% of these homicides used a firearm.185  Firearm ownership 
imposes a high level of responsibility on the owner requiring concentration and 
stability; alcohol impedes the owner’s mental capacity by blocking higher brain 
functions.186  Not only does alcohol spark aggression towards others but “individuals 
may place themselves at risk of firearm injury by consuming alcohol.”187 
 
1. Prejudice Towards Other Groups 
 
Some research suggests that alcohol intoxication causes heightened or agitated 
racial animus.188  An interesting recent study involved participants who, after 
drinking provided alcoholic or non-alcoholic beverages (the latter being the control), 
were tasked with shooting a target person in a computer simulation based on whether 
the target held a gun or not.189  The targets chosen depicted ten Middle Eastern and 
White faces holding a gun, a beverage, or nothing.190  At the end of the test, the 
participants were asked to rate the target faces on a scale of zero, very unpleasant, 
to one hundred, very pleasant.191 
The results revealed disturbing conclusions, “participants who consumed 
alcohol showed a greater bias to shoot Middle Eastern targets” compared to the 
 
184  Charles Branas, Alcohol & Firearms: Research, Gaps in Knowledge, and Possible 
Interventions, INST. MED. 1, 7, https://www.nap.edu/resource/21814/Alcohol-Firearms.pdf (last visited 
Oct 10, 2020). Moreover, intoxicated individuals may “overreact to perceived threats and instigate 
violent situations due to alcohol-impaired judgement of verbal and nonverbal social cues.” Id. 
185  See Lisa Dunn, Alcohol Misuse And Gun Violence: What We Know, GUNS & AMERICA (Dec. 
2017) https://gunsandamerica.org/story/19/12/17/relationship-between-alcohol-gun-violence/ (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2020). See also, Garen Wintemute, et al., Alcohol, Drug and Other Prior Crimes and 
Risk of Arrest in Handgun Purchasers: Protocol for a Controlled Observational Study, 22 INJ. PREV. 
302 (2016) (“Firearm ownership itself may be associated with alcohol abuse, including binge drinking 
and heavy drinking [and] linked to homicide and suicide risk when firearms are in the home, such 
studies are not restricted to firearm owners and do not assess risk for committing interpersonal 
violence.”). 
186  Manoel E. S. Modelli & Stephane Mota Lourenco, Alcohol Influence in Violent Deaths, J. 
FORENSIC RES. 1, 2 (2016). 
In our country, in the city of Rio de Janeiro, the study concluded that there was a positive 
correlation between episodes of aggression, falls, victims of firearm projectile, hanging, 
drowning, and the values of blood concentration of alcohol, although prevalence of these 
corresponds to 23% of all circumstances. In Rio Grande do Sul, in Porto Alegre, survey of 
1585 victims of violent death, 53.3% had blood alcohol content above 6 mg/dl. 
Id. at 3. 
187  Branas, supra note 184, at 9. Alcohol consumption increases the likelihood that the consumer 
will harm themselves either intentionally or unintentionally, “over one-third of gun suicides involve 
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placebo counterparts.192  Thus, alcohol when combined with possession of firearms 
not only increases aggression but creates significantly more prejudice towards 
Middle Eastern targets.193 
 
2. Police Discretion When Granting Licenses to Chronic Alcohol Abusers 
 
The majority of states do not grant police discretion on whether to issue a 
concealed-carry firearm license;194 in these “shall-issue” states, applicants that 
satisfy applicable statutory requirements automatically receive a concealed-carry 
firearm license.195  Such states should adopts laws or regulations that expressly 
prohibit firearm licensing (i.e., concealed-carry permits) for individuals convicted 
of alcohol-related crimes.196  In “may-issue” states, in contrast, local police chiefs 
have discretionary authority to deny firearm licenses or permits based on known 
drug or alcohol abuse.197  Given the strong correlation between alcohol abuse and 
suicide and homicide,198 police chiefs in “may-issue” states are more likely to deny 
 
alcohol.”  Id. at 7. Individuals seeking to end their life using a gun will often times seek alcohol to 
prepare themselves “in anticipation of a painful or violent end.”  Alcohol lessens any doubts they may 
have about killing themselves, thus, facilitating the suicide. Id. 
188  Timothy P. Schofield, et al.., Alcohol Consumption Increases Bias to Shoot at Middle Eastern 
but Not White Targets, 20 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 202, 202 (2017). This phenomenon 
may explain what took place during the 1980 Scottish Cup when violent riots erupted between the 
opposing soccer team. 
189  Id. 205–06. 
190  Id. at 207.  
191  Id. 
192  Id. at 209. 
193  Id. at 211 (“When an individual is under the influence of alcohol, they need not be provoked 
to elicit hostility: simply being a member of a group that individuals are prejudiced toward may be 
sufficient to become a victim of aggression.”). 
194  See Which States Are Likely to Issue Gun Permits and Which Are Not, HG.ORG, 
https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/which-states-are-likely-to-issue-gun-permits-and-which-are-not-
31130 (last visited Oct 10, 2020). States without discretionary practices are also known as “shall-issue” 
states, where, states that permit police discretion are known as “may-issue” states. Typically, “may-
issue” states require a showing of a specific circumstance that is necessary for concealed gun 
ownership. Id. 
195  See David Hemenway & James G. Hicks, ‘May issue’ Gun Carrying Laws and Police 
Discretion: Some Evidence from Massachusetts, 36 J. OF PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 324, 324–25 (2015). 
196  See Michael Siegel & Claire Boine, What Are the Most Effective Policies in Reducing Gun 
Homicides? ROCKEFELLER INST. GOV’T 1, 12 (2019). 
197  See Hemenway & Hicks, supra note 195, at 328–29. 
198  See Vittes, et al., supra note 176, at 68 (surveying studies on this point). 
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the license. The denial of concealed-carry licenses to applicants with a history of 
alcohol abuse is likely to reduce the impact of gun violence in “may-issue” states.199  
These denials are justifiable because heavy drinkers are more likely to engage in 
“firearm assault compared with non-drinkers.”200  In fact, approximately one-third 
of firearm fatalities involve consuming alcohol before the incident.201 
Research suggests police discretion under “may-issue” permitting regimes can 
have a large impact on reducing homicides–larger than many other gun-control 
policies, such as regulating types of firearm, restricting locations for firearm use, 
and requiring “good cause” for obtaining a gun license or carrying permit.202  It 
makes sense to deny firearm licenses to people who are at high risk for violence.203 
 
3. California Gun Violence Legislation 
 
California lawmakers adopted a Gun Violence Restraining Order (GVRO), 
which allows the court to swiftly respond to instances when imminent violence 
exists by immediately intervening and revoking gun privileges to address the gap 
caused by “many individuals who are at high and imminent risk for violence to 
themselves and others [but] do not meet any existing criteria for prohibiting access 
to firearms” by monitoring risky behavior after lawful possession and removing the 
firearms from high-risk individuals.204  Evidence of imminent violence may involve 
consumption of “controlled substances or alcohol or ongoing abuse of controlled 
substances or alcohol” found in police reports, records of convictions or offenses.205  
Once a GVRO is issued, law enforcement will require that the firearms “be 
surrendered to a law enforcement agency or transferred (by sale or temporary 
 
199  See Hemenway & Hicks, supra note 195, at 328. 
200  See Robert A. Tessler, et al., State-Level Beer Excise Tax and Firearm Homicide in 
Adolescents and Young Adults, 56 AM. J. PREV. MED. 708–09 (May 2019). 
201  Id. at 708. 
202  Siegel & Boine, supra note 196, at 2. 
203  Id. at 12. 
204  Hannah S. Laqueur & Garen J. Wintemute, Identifying High-Risk Firearm Owners to Prevent 
Mass Violence, CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 109, 110 (2019). 
[A]lmost no attention has been given to enforcing existing restrictions on ownership among 
those who become prohibited persons after a legal firearm purchase. This gap is important 
to fill not only because prohibiting events are general indicators of risk, but also because 
transitions to prohibited person status occur as the result of events associated with increased 
risk for violence in the near future. 
Id. at 110. 
205  Id. at 114. 
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safekeeping) to a licensed firearm retailer within 24 hours of the service of the 
order.206 
In addition to restraining orders, California implemented its unique Armed and 
Prohibited Persons System (APPS), which is a community-wide effort to identify 
“newly prohibited persons among legal firearm owners and for recovering those 
firearms.”207  Reports are submitted to the DOJ that may trigger firearm prohibition 
such as “criminal convictions, domestic violence restraining orders, certain  
psychiatric hospitalization, and the like.”208  Afterwards, the reports are reviewed by 
the DOJ for further assessment and possible intervention to mandate the 
relinquishment of firearms.209  In sum, “[t]he value of these laws . . . is that they may  
be effective in identifying individuals who, despite passing a background check, 
later become high-risk gun owners because of behavior  that indicates a threat to 
themselves or others.”210 
 
4. Youth, Alcohol, and Firearm Assault 
 
Adolescents are four times more likely than adults to be the victim of a firearm 
homicide, if they misuse alcohol.211  This can be explained because alcohol-using 
adolescents are more likely to possess firearms compared to those who abstain from 
drinking alcohol.212  Although some states have responded to this phenomenon by 
increasing the price of alcohol,213 other states have responded by implementing 
firearm policies targeting youth access to guns.214 
Studies have found that a Florida child access prevention (CAP) law decreased 
unintentional gun deaths among those 14 years or younger.215  However, there was 
no relation between state laws banning possession of firearms by minors and 
 
206  Id. Unfortunately, the restraining order program is only temporary and the population overall 
lacks awareness of the program. 
207  Id. at 116. 
208  Id. at 117. 
209  Id. at 118. 
210  Siegel & Boine, supra note 196 at 12. 
211  Tessler et al., supra note 200 at 709. Since beer is common among adolescents, a study 
revealed that an excise tax imposed on beer was correlated with decreased “firearm homicides among 
individuals aged 15–34 years.”  Id. at 712. As a result, the study found that adolescents are price-
sensitive, which in turn, prevents violence and traffic accidents. Id. at 713. 
212  Id. at 709 (“[F]irearm ownership on college campuses has been associated with risky and 
aggressive alcohol-related behaviors.”). 
213  Id. at 712. 
214  Siegel & Boine, supra note 196 at 12–22. 
215  Id. at 22. 
2020  INTERPLAY BETWEEN CSA &GCA  247 
 
unintentional firearm deaths outside of Florida216  While this study proved to be 
uncertain, several studies have since proven the effect on unintentional firearm 
deaths among children under 14 years old.217  For example, a study examining state 
safe storage gun laws found a reduction in accidental firearm deaths among 
children.218  Together with several other studies, there is sufficient evidence to 
conclude that laws restricting firearm access to children will prevent unintentional 
firearm injuries and deaths among children.219 
 
 
216  Id. 
217  Effects of Child-Access Prevention Laws on Unintentional Injuries and Deaths, RAND 
CORP., (Mar. 2, 2018) https://www.rand.org/research/gun-policy/analysis/child-access-prevention/ 
unintentional-injuries.html. 
218  Id. 
219  Id. 
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5. State v. Weber 
 
Ohio, for example, prohibits firearm carrying for alcohol users: “No person, 
while under the influence of alcohol or any drug of abuse, shall carry or use any 
firearm or dangerous ordnance,” which apparently applies even if the firearm is 
unloaded.220  State v. Weber221 was a 2019 case involving a Second Amendment 
challenge to this statute by a defendant charged with using weapons while 
intoxicated; Weber challenged the law as being unconstitutional when applied to the 
facts of his case.222  Weber’s wife had reported a domestic dispute to the police, 
alleging Weber was intoxicated and in possession of a gun,223 though there was no 
proof that Weber was intending to use the gun to perpetrate a crime, but only that he 
was severely intoxicated.224. 
In court, Weber claimed that the statute forces citizens like him to choose 
between their constitutional right to keep arms at home,225 to defend himself and his 
family against potential (hypothetical) criminal attacks, and alcohol use. The 
premise of Weber’s constitutionality argument lies under the castle doctrine.226  The 
court rejected this argument because Weber had not, in fact, faced a situation that 
required him to defend his family.227 
Then, invoking the famous disclaimer in Heller that the Second Amendment is 
not an unlimited right,228  the court concluded that the State has a strong and 
compelling interest to prevent gun violence, which is closely related to alcohol 
 
220  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.15 (West). The Ohio General Assembly explained the 
reasoning by the statute as follows: 
The rationale for the offense is that carrying or using firearms or dangerous ordnance 
without having complete control of one's faculties presents a danger as great as driving 
while intoxicated. In part, the section is also designed as a tool to permit law enforcement 
officers to step in and prevent the commission of more serious crimes, as well as tragic 
accidents. There is no exception to the prohibition--law enforcement officers, demolition 
experts, sportsmen, and others must all be sober at the time they carry or use firearms or 
dangerous ordnance. 
221  2019-Ohio-916, 132 N.E.3d 1140 (Ohio Ct. App), appeal not allowed, 156 Ohio St.3d 1452, 
2019-Ohio-2780, 125 N.E.3d 941 (Ohio 2019). 
222  See id. 
223  Id. at 1143. 
224  Id. There was strong evidence of Weber’s inebriation such as his “eyes were bloodshot and 
glassy, his speech was slurred, he was unsteady on his feet, and an odor of an alcoholic beverage was 
detected on his person.”  Id. at 1145. In fact, Weber even admitted to being drunk to the officers himself, 
several times. Id. 
225  Id. at 1146. 
226  Id. 
227  Id. 
228  Id. 
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abuse.229  The statute was sufficiently tailored to serve the significant government 
interest of guarding public safety, and it left open ample opportunities to bear and 
keep arms.230 
 
B. Constitutionality of Federal Disarmament for Alcohol Abuse Under §922(g)(1) 
 
Another way that states fill the gap in federal firearm policy regarding alcohol 
is to adopt statutes that make repeated alcohol-related offenses (typically DUI or 
DWI arrests and/or convictions) a felony, which then triggers a felony report to the 
NICS database, or a state counterpart. The most frequently-applied federal firearm 
disqualifier, both in terms of gun purchase denials (failed background checks) and 
prosecutions, is 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1), which prohibits firearm possession by 
prohibited persons who have been convicted of a crime punishable by over one year 
in prison.231  Some states, such as Pennsylvania, impose a penalty of up to five years 
imprisonment for multiple convictions of driving under the influence (DUI) at the 
highest blood alcohol content (BAC); thus, exposing convicted persons to the 
possibility of federal disarmament under §922(g)(1).232 
In Holloway v. Attorney General,233 the Third Circuit upheld the statute’s 
validity against a Second Amendment challenge, concluding that a DUI is 
considered a “serious crime.”234  Holloway had two DUI convictions. The first 
charge, in 2002, was eventually dismissed under an accelerated rehabilitation 
 
229  Id. at 1148. 
230  Id. at 1147. The statute is far from being overly burdensome because the limitation is only 
temporary while the individual is inebriated. After the person recovers, they are able to possess and use 
a firearm lawfully. This argument is supported by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, which stated: 
[U]nlike those who have been convicted of a felony or committed to a mental institution 
and so face a lifetime ban, an unlawful drug user like Yancey could regain his right to 
possess a firearm simply by ending his drug abuse. In that sense, the restriction in [the 
statute] is far less onerous than those affecting felons and the mentally ill. The prohibition 
in [the statute] bars only those persons who are current drug users from possessing a 
firearm. 
United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 686–687 (7th Cir. 2010). 
231  18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(1) (West). 
232  See 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1104; 75 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 
3802(c), 3803(b)(4). 
233  948 F.3d 164 (3d Cir. 2020). 
234  Id. at 168. Although most circuits have taken a very different approach, the Third Circuit’s 
earlier decision in Binderup v. Att’y General United States, 836 F.3d 336, 349 (3d Cir. 2016) provided 
a framework for examining Second Amendment challenges by holding that only “persons who have 
committed serious crimes forfeit the [Second Amendment] right to possess firearms much the way they 
‘forfeit other civil liberties, including fundamental constitutional rights.’”  Id. at 341. In sum, the 
challenger must establish “that he poses no greater threat of future violent criminal activity than the 
average law-abiding citizen.”  Id. 
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program. For the second charge, in 2005, he entered a guilty plea for violating the 
Pennsylvania statute. Eleven years later, Holloway failed a background check for 
purchasing a firearm because he was disqualified under § 922(g)(1). The Third 
Circuit acknowledged that there is no bright line rule for determining whether the 
offense reaches the “serious crime” threshold but analyzed several factors such as 
the legislature’s intent and the degree of punishment.235  The court began its analysis 
by citing a definition from Black’s Law Dictionary for “serious,” which states that 
it is “dangerous; potentially resulting in death or other severe consequences.”236  The 
Supreme Court on several occasions has described drunk driving as a “potentially 
deadly crime.”237  Moreover, national highway safety programs require states to 
advance initiatives to “reduce injuries and deaths resulting from persons driving 
motor vehicles while impaired by alcohol.”238  Note that this decision is consistent 
in result but different in methodology from some other recent federal district court 
decisions analyzing disarmament under the same Pennsylvania statute.239 
Part of what makes the Holloway case significant is that the Third Circuit had 
previously broken from other federal circuit courts, in Binderup v. Attorney 
General,240 in holding that the felon prohibition did violate the Second Amendment, 
at least as applied in the case, because the felony itself had been a nonviolent crime 
that received a lenient sentence. Binderup receives frequent mention in discussions 
about the Second Amendment and the felon disarmament, due to its unique place 
among circuit court decisions on this topic. It is unclear whether Holloway signals a 
change in direction for the Third Circuit, or if it merely narrows the applicability of 
the approach in Binderup. 
 
 
235  Holloway, 948 F.3d 173–75. 
236  Id. at 173–74 
237  Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10, 11 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting from denial of writ of 
certiorari); see also Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2541 (2019) (Sotomayor, J. dissenting); 
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 141 (2008); Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2179 
(2016) (describing drunk drivers as “dangerous offenders”). 
238  Holloway, 948 F.3d at 174. 
239  See, e.g., Williams v. Barr, 379 F. Supp.3d 360, 380 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (“While we find that § 
922(g)(1) burdens Williams’ Second Amendment rights because his disqualifying conviction was not 
‘serious,’ [t]he law is constitutional as applied because the Government has satisfied its burden of 
intermediate scrutiny.”). 
240  Binderup, 836 F.3d 336, 352–53 (3d Cir. 2016). 




In the fifty years since the enactment of the Controlled Substances Act, it has 
led to the growth of mass incarceration, served as a continuous drain on judicial 
resources, and has become a tangled web of criminal procedural rules and rights 
crafted largely in response to drug enforcement efforts. At the same time, an often-
overlooked effect of the CSA has been its ambiguous role in our regulatory regime 
for firearms. The smaller but most direct role is the incorporation of the CSA into 
the Gun Control Act itself, in § 922(g)(3), making violators of the CSA “prohibited 
persons,” that is, legally ineligible to own or use a gun. In this capacity, the CSA 
screens several thousand would-be purchasers each year from buying guns, due to 
failed background checks, and subjects hundreds of individuals to arrest and 
prosecution for firearm possession, usually in conjunction with, or in lieu of, other 
drug-related charges. The larger but less direct role is through another section of the 
Gun Control Act, § 922(g)(1), which prohibits convicted felons from possessing 
firearms. This felon-disarmament provision has screened more than five times as 
many would-be purchasers from buying over the last two decades as § 922(g)(3); in 
fact, felon-based denials outnumber all other denial reasons combined, including 
mental illness, fugitives from justice, immigration violations, and dishonorable 
discharge from the military.241  The connection of these denials to the CSA is the 
disproportionate number of felonies that are drug-related. Of greater significance are 
the thousands of arrests and convictions every year for felons found in possession of 
a firearm, leading to their reincarceration for lengthy terms. In addition, the presence 
of a firearm during an illegal drug transaction can result in lengthy sentencing 
enhancements and a higher gradation for the charges. We could impose firearm 
forfeiture—and even include periodic peaceful inspections of these individuals to 
search for newly-acquired weapons—without imposing lengthy prison sentences. 
Gun control does not require mass incarceration, it merely requires gun removal. 
The lengthy imprisonment of tens of thousands of individuals for gun-related 
charges, or gun-related sentencing factors, has significant negative societal effects, 
and these effects fall disproportionately on poor minority communities. At the same 
time, the screening effects that the CSA provides through the background check 
system, directly through §922(g)(3) and indirectly through §922(g)(1), have 
become, functionally speaking, our society’s primary mechanism of gun control, the 
primary means of restraining, even a little, the number of guns entering the stream 
of commerce and ending up on our streets. Gun deaths have reached epidemic 
proportions, according to public health experts, even as overall crime rates have 
fallen to historic lows in most of the country—in 2017, gun deaths surpassed the 
number of automobile fatalities for the first time242, and the numbers have held in 
 
241  See 2018 OPERATIONS REPORT, supra note 27, at 17. 
242  See Underlying Cause of Death, 1999–2017 Results, CTR. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 
(Dec. 2018), 
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the two years since.243  Guns as a leading cause of death for Americans (the number 
one cause of death for certain segments of the population) have become the new 
normal. Gun sales in the last ten years have also been at historic highs, with millions 
of new firearms pouring through the primary retail market, and from there to the 
black market, every year. We need to do more to stem the tide of the oversupply of 
firearms, and for better or worse, right now the CSA is playing a central role in this. 
There is also a channeling effect to the CSA’s role in gun control: whatever 
baleful limits the CSA-GCA connection is placing on the gun supply and gun 
trafficking is also disproportionately helping vulnerable, poor, high-crime 
communities, where gun violence concentrates. Even if drug users are not inherently 
prone to violence, and even if convicted drug felons, upon release, are not violent—
in fact, drug users and felons may be at higher risk of being victims of violence than 
perpetrators—their social networks are disproportionately likely to include 
individuals involved in criminal or violent activities. Disarming a drug user or felon 
means their gun is not available for a violence-prone relative, roommate, 
acquaintance, or neighbor to borrow, buy, or steal. From the standpoint of protecting 
our vulnerable communities, the disarmament of felons and those with a history of 
drug arrests plays a vital role in reducing the stock and supply of guns used in crimes 
and suicides. This reduction in the gun supply in high-crime communities—and the 
reduction in gun violence that it would produce—can be achieved with firearm 




243  See Daniel Nass, Gun Deaths Again Neared 40,000 in 2018, Latest CDC Data Shows, THE 
TRACE Feb. 12, 2020, https://www.thetrace.org/2020/02/gun-deaths-suicide-cdc-data-2018/ (“The 
number of gun deaths in America held steady in 2018, following three straight years of significant 
increases, according to new data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.”); Heath Druzin, 
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